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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN PRISON
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
MICHAEL JACKSONt
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974 I described the Canadian penitentiary as "an outlaw of
the criminal justice system".' This judgment was based upon my
analysis of the disciplinary system which prevailed in the warden's
courts and the associated practices of administrative segregation
and disciplinary transfer. I further concluded that this lawless state
was perpetuated by the great reluctance of the Canadian courts to
intervene behind prison walls through an effective process of judicial
review. Arguing from the twin premises that the penitentiary must
adhere to the rule of law and that prison justice must balance the
legitimate interests of the keeper and the kept, I advanced a model
of reform. The most important elements in that model were that
prison disciplinary boards be presided over by independent chair-
persons and that a prisoner's right to representation by counsel be
recognized.
Since 1974 significant developments have taken place affecting
the administration of prison justice. In 1977 an all-party Parlia-
mentary Subcommittee on the Penitentiary System in Canada, ap-
pointed as a result of a series of riots in the fall of 1976 in four
maximum security penitentiaries, confirmed my own indictment of
the system as lawless. The Subcommittee stated:
There is a great deal of irony in the fact that imprisonment -the
ultimate product of our system of criminal justice - itself epitomizes
injustice. We have in mind the general absence within penitentiaries
t Of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. I wish to thank
Ms. Maria Morellato for her thoughtful contribution to this article. Ms.
Morellato acted as my research assistant and the field work was our joint
effort.
@ Michael Jackson, i986.
1 M. Jackson, "Justice Behind the Walls -A Study of the Disciplinary
Process in a Canadian Penitentiary" (974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. i.
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of a system of justice that protects the victim as well as punishes
the transgressor; a system of justice that provides a rational basis
for ordering a community- including a prison community-
according to decent standards and rules known in advance; a
system of justice that is manifested by fair and impartial procedures
that are strictly observed; a system of justice that proceeds from
rules that cannot be avoided at will; a system of justice to which
all are subject without fear or favour. In other words, we mean
justice according to Canadian law. In penitentiaries, some of these
constituents of justice simply do not exist. Others are only a matter
of degree - a situation which is hardly consistent with any under-
standable or coherent concept of justice.2
To redress this situation the Subcommittee advocated that two
principles must be accepted. The first was that "the rule of law
must prevail inside Canadian penitentiaries" ;S the second that:
justice from inmates is a personal right and also an essential condi-
tion of their socialization and personal reformation. It implies
respect for both persons and property of others and fairness in
treatment. The arbitrariness traditionally associated with prison
life must be replaced by clear rules, fair disciplinary procedures and
the providing of reasons for all decisions affecting inmates.4
The Parliamentary Subcommittee also had something to say of
the relationship between the absence of judicial review and the law-
lessness of prison life.
The gross irregularities, lack of standards and arbitrariness that
exist in our penitentiaries, by their very quantity, make, and al-
ways have made, the possibility of judicial intervention into prison
matters a rather impracticable, time-consuming and dismaying pros-
pect, as the judges themselves have pointed out. To open the courts
to redress of these conditions would invite inmates to continue to
increase the levels of their confrontation with prison staff and
management, using the courts for purposes that, just like the
present running battle between the opposing sides, are largely
unassociated with any genuine interest in improving the operation
of the system. By the same argument, however, the present judicial
policy invites the perpetuation by the authorities of a system that is
so far removed from normal standards of justice that it remains
safely within the class of matters in which the imposition of judicial
or quasi-judicial procedures would clearly be, in most instances, in-
conceivable. Further, this would ensure that the sheer immensity
2 Report to Parliament by the Subcommittee on the Penitentiary System in
Canada (1977) at 85.
s Id. at 86.
4 Id. at 87.
5 Id at 86.
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of the task of straightening it out is enough to discourage even the
most committed members of the judiciary. The worse things are in
the penitentiary system, therefore, the more self-evident it is to the
courts that Parliament could not possibly have intended for them
to intervene. Injustice, as well as virtue, can be its own reward.5
The Subcommittee made specific recommendations to bring the
rule of law into the prisons, the most important of which were that
the rules governing life in the prison should have the force of law
and that independent chairpersons should preside over disciplinary
proceedings. With these and other legislative and administrative
reforms in place, the Subcommittee envisaged an expanded role for
judicial review to ensure that those involved in the management and
administration of the revised system adhered to general standards
of natural justice and due process of law as they substantially exist
elsewhere in the criminal justice system.
Following the release of the Report, the Solicitor General an-
nounced the appointment of independent chairpersons to preside
over disciplinary courts in maximum security institutions. In 1979
the Supreme Court of Canada, in the landmark decision of Mar-
tineau v. Matsqui Institution Inmate Disciplinary Board (No. 2),6
ruled that prison disciplinary decisions were subject to the general
administrative law duty to act fairly and to the superintendency of
the courts to ensure compliance with that duty. That same year the
Supreme Court in R. v. Solosky' affirmed that prisoners retain all
of their rights and liberties except those expressly or explicitly taken
away from them by law. In 198o the Solicitor General extended the
system of independent chairpersons to medium security institutions.
In 1985 the Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases -Cardinal and
Oswald v. The Director of Kent Institution, The Queen v. Miller,
and Morin v. National Special Handling Unit Review Committee8
- further enhanced the scope of prisoners' rights by ruling that
prisoners have the right not to be deprived unlawfully of the relative
or residual liberty permitted in the general population of an institu-
tion and that any significant deprivation of that liberty could be
challenged through habeas corpus.
It has, however, been a pervasive theme of most writing in the
field of corrections that law and policy carefully crafted in the
6 [198o] i S.G.R. 6o2, (1979) xo6 D.L.R. (3 d) 385.
7 (1979) 50 C.C.O. (2d) 495, 1o5 D.L.R. (3d) 745 (S.C.C.).
8 [r986]i W.W.R. 577, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 44; (1986) 24 D.L.R. (4th) 9;
(r986) 24 D.L.R. (4th) 7, 49 O.R. ( 3d) 26.
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courtroom and policy makers' offices do not necessarily translate
into real change in the daily practice of imprisonment.' Has the
acceptance by the Solicitor General of the Parliamentary Subcom-
mittee's principles regarding the rule of law and justice as a personal
right for prisoners and the establishment of independent chairper-
sons, coupled with the imprimatur of the Supreme Court of Canada
on the legitimacy of judicial review of prison disciplinary decisions,
ended the arbitrariness of prison life and made the prison experience
a lawful one for the thousands of prisoners who are subjected to it?
It was to answer these questions that in 1983 I revisited Matsqui
Institution, the penitentiary which was the subject of my 1974
study. Over a six month period I observed the disciplinary court
hearings presided over by an independent chairperson; observed
that segregation review and earned remission processes; and inter-
viewed members of the penitentiary administration, line staff and
prisoners on their experiences and views on prison justice as it is
practised in the 198os.
Because Matsqul is a medium security institution and the greatest
tensions between prison order and justice are to be found in maxi-
mum security institutions, I extended the original scope of the 1974
study to include a parallel review, during the same six month period,
of the disciplinary practices at Kent Maximum Security Institution,
which was opened in i98i to replace the B.C. Penitentiary. Since
the summer of 1983 I have regularly revisited Kent and Matsqui
and have continued to observe the disciplinary and related processes.
The purposes of this larger study, which is ongoing, are not only
to reveal the changes and continuity in prison disciplinary practices
but also to better understand the strengths and limitations of judicial
review in a prison setting. With such an understanding it then
becomes possible to consider whether further reforms, such as
legislated administrative codes, are necessary to entrench the rule
of law behind prison walls.
In 1985 the Federal Court of Appeal, in the case of Re Howard
and Presiding Officer of the Inmate Disciplinary Court of Stony
Mountain Institution,0 ruled that in certain circumstances a prisoner
had the right to representation by legal counsel in prison disciplinary
hearings. This right flows from principles of fundamental justice
9 See M. Jackson, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada
(983) ch. 5; J. Jacobs, "The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its Im-
pacts, is6o-8o" in N. Morris and M. Tonry, eds., Crime and Justice: An
Annual Review of Research, vol. 2 (i98o) at 429.
20 (x985) 45 C.R. (3d) 242 (Fed. C.A.).
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now constitutionally entrenched in section 7 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.1
Potentially, this is the most significant prison decision thus far
rendered by a Canadian court. The purpose of this article is to
locate the Howard decision within a dual framework of evolving
correctional law and the daily practise of justice in Canadian
prisons. In so doing I hope to provide a further opportunity to
consider the crucial question of the roles of the law, the courts,
and lawyers, within prison walls.
II. THE PRIVATE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PRISON
The disciplinary code of a federal penitentiary has to be traced
through a multi-tiered legal and administrative structure. The Peni-
tentiary Service Regulations, 2 made pursuant to authority under
the Penitentiary Act,"5 set out what constitutes a disciplinary of-
fence,' 4 authorize the appointment of independent chairpersons to
preside over disciplinary hearings, and prescribe a range of punish-
" Schedule B, Constitution Act, r982.
12 SOR/8o-2o9, ss. 38, 39; am. SOR/8 5 -412; am. SOR/85-631.
13 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6, s. 29(1).
14 Section 39 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations (as amended in 1985)
reads:
Every inmate commits a disciplinary offence who
(a) disobeys or fails to obey a lawful order of a penitentiary officer;
(b) assaults or threatens to assault another person;
(c) refuses to work or fails to work to the best of his ability;
(d) leaves his work without permission;
(e) wilfully or negligently damages any property of Her Majesty or the
property of another person;
(f) wilfully wastes food;
(g) behaves toward any other person, by his actions, language or writing,
in an indecent, disrespectful, threatening or defamatory manner;
(h) wilfully disobeys or fails to obey any regulation or rule governing the
conduct of inmates;
(i) has contraband in his possession;
(i. ) consumes, absorbs, swallows, smokes, inhales, injects or otherwise
uses an intoxicant;
(j) deals in contraband with any other person;
(k) does any act that is calculated to prejudice the discipline or good
order of the institution;
(I) does any act with intent to escape or to assist another inmate to
escape the institution;
(l.L) is in an area prohibited to inmates;
(m) gives or offers a bribe or reward to any person for any person;
(n) contravenes any rule, regulation or directive made under the Act; or
(o) attempts to do anything mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (n).
r986
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ments. 5 The authorized punishments move up on an escalating
scale depending upon whether the disciplinary offence is classified
by staff as minor, intermediary or serious.16 The Regulations further
provide that, where a hearing is presided over by the independent
chairperson, assistance shall be provided by institutional staff ad-
visers whose role is limited to providing advice on the appropriate
punishment. The Regulations, however, provide only a skeletal
framework of the internal disciplinary world of the prison. The
fleshing out of the skeleton is left to what are termed Commissioner's
Directives and Divisional Instructions which are issued by the
National Headquarters of the Canadian Correctional Service in
Ottawa pursuant to authority contained in the Penitentiary Act."'
Although these Commissioner's Directives and Divisional Instruc-
tions have been held by the courts not to have the force of law, 8
it is within the volumes of these Directives and Instructions that the
detailed procedures for disciplinary hearings are to be found.
They contain detailed provisions relating to the laying of a formal
charge, the determination of the category of the offence and the
provision for advance written notice to the prisoner of the charge."
Where the charge is designated as minor the hearing is held by
staff members. For those offences designated serious or intermediary
the Directives provide for a hearing before the independent chair-
person. The Directives and Instructions also deal with the conduct
of the hearing. They provide for a formal plea, an opportunity for
the prisoner to be heard, including the presentation of relevant
documents, the questioning of witnesses through the chairperson
and, where the chairperson deems it necessary, the calling of wit-
nesses on behalf of the prisoner and, upon an admission or finding
of guilt, guidelines for the awarding of appropriate punishment.
15 The independent chairpersons who have been appointed generally are
practising or retired lawyers or judges.
16 Until 1985 there was only a dual classification of minor and serious. The
intermediary category was introduced after the Federal Court of Appeal
decision in Howard, supra, note io. See also text accompanying note lo9.
17 Supra, note 13, s. 29(3).
's Martineau and Butters v. Matsqui Institution Inmate Disciplinary Board
(No. r) [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118, 74 D.L.R. (3d) i; Martineau (No. 2),
supra, note 6; In Re Morin and National SHU Review Committee (0985)
210 C.C.C. (3d) 123 (Fed. C.A.), MacGugan J. A. stated at i3o: "In
light of the majority decision in the Supreme Court of Canada in [Mar-
tineau (No. r)], commissioner's directives live at best in a kind of legal
twilight, 'clearly of an administrative, not a legislative nature' ".
19 The current Commissioner's Directives and Divisional Instructions are
referenced as 600.7.03.1, 1985-07-05.
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They also provide that the technicalities of the rules of evidence in
criminal matters do not apply and that any evidence may be
admitted which the chairperson considers reasonable or trustworthy.
Any evidence given must be recorded.
The Regulations themselves, as I have indicated, authorize or
prescribe punishments by reference to the category of the offence.
For minor offences the authorized punishments are a warning, loss
of privileges, restitution up to a maximum of $500 where the
prisoner has been convicted of wilfully or negligently damaging
property. For an intermediary offence, in addition to the above
punishments, the prisoner may be fined not more than $50 or sen-
tenced to punitive dissociation not exceeding thirty days except,
where a prisoner is convicted of more than one offence, a greater
sentence may be imposed if approved by the Deputy Commissioner
of the region. In the case of serious offences, in addition to all those
punishments authorized for intermediary offences, a prisoner may
be sentenced to forfeit his remission. Although no maximum limit
is imposed on this punishment in the Regulations, it is provided in
the Commissioner's Directives and Divisional Instructions that no
forfeiture of remission more than thirty days shall be valid without
concurrence of the Deputy Commissioner of the region, nor more
than ninety days without the concurrence of the Solicitor General.
It is also provided that any sentence may be suspended on the con-
dition that the prisoner is not found guilty of another intermediary
or flagrant offence during a specified period not exceeding ninety
days.
In order to understand what is at stake in prison disciplinary
hearings it is necessary to convey some sense of what these punish-
ments involve. At Kent the privileges most commonly affected are
night recreation (the loss of which involves the prisoner being con-
fined to his cell after the evening meal) and open visiting privileges.
The prisoner, instead of being able to visit with friends and family
across a table where physical contact is permitted, is restricted to
contact by telephone through a screened partition. Prisoners, es-
pecially those with young children, view it as a severe punishment.
Punitive dissociation is a euphemism for solitary confinement,
otherwise known as "the hole". Prisoners sentenced to dissociation
are detained in a special wing of the prison and are locked up in
their cells for twenty-three hours a day. The remaining hour is for
exercise during which time they are permitted a limited form of
association with other prisoners in the exercise yard. At both Kent
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
and Matsqui Institutions exercise takes place in small enclosed
yards which permit a prisoner to do no more than pace up and
down. Prisoners are not permitted any vocational or hobby privileges
and any visit they receive are closed screen visits
In Martineau (No. 2) Dickson J. referred to a sentence of puni-
tive dissociation this way:
[T]he Board's decision had the effect of depriving an individual
of his liberty by committing him to a "prison within a prison".2 '
At both Kent and Matsqui Institutions, because of pressures of
overcrowding, a sentence of punitive dissociation will also result in
a prisoner losing his individual cell in the general population to-
gether with his job, so that when he has served his sentence he is
required to go into the induction range where he will be double
bunked. Next to solitary confinement, double bunking is viewed
by prisoners as the toughest form of imprisonment. Whereas solitary
is a major deprivation of association and communication with other
prisoners, double bunking is a major deprivation of privacy, a value
which more than any other is at a premium in prison. For men
serving long sentences (as most of them are at Kent Institution),
who have established routines in the general population, the regres-
sion to solitary confinement followed by double bunking is a deeply
resented serial punishment. 2
A prisoner sentenced to forfeit remission has his liberty interest
more directly affected. Under the provisions of the Penitentiary
Act a prisoner can earn up to one-third of his sentence as remission.
This entities him under the provisions of the Parole Act to be
released from prison on mandatory supervision after serving two-
thirds of his sentence. If he is sentenced to forefeit remission he
has already earned, this will set back his mandatory supervision
release date.
Superimposed upon all of these discrete consequences of convic-
tion for a disciplinary offence is the impact which such a conviction
will have upon a whole range of institutional decisions affecting the
20 For a description of the rigours of dissociation, see Jackson, supra, note 9.
21 Supra, note 6 at 622.
2 Double bunking has been the subject of a constitutional challenge on the
basis that the practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or treat-
ment contrary to section s2 of the Charter. The challenge was dismissed at
trial in Piche v. Solicitor General of Canada (x985) 17 0C.C.. (3d) i
(F.C.T.D.). The case is now on appeal.
23 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-2, s. 15().
VOL. 20:2
x986 RIGHT TO COUNSEL 229
life of the prisoner. Quite independent of the disciplinary board
sentence, under the earned remission scheme a prisoner convicted of
an offence will fail to earn remission for the month in which the
offence is committed or, in the case of punitive dissociation, the
sentence is served. Under this scheme a prisoner is eligible to earn
up to fifteen days a month remission. The decision to credit or fail
to credit is made by an internal board consisting of an assistant
warden and two staff members. The board conducts a review of all
prisoners who have been convicted of disciplinary offences. For
minor offences the prisoner may fail to earn up to two days for each
offence. For serious or intermediary offences he may fail to earn
up to the maximum of the fifteen days he is eligible to earn. Further-
more, for every three days served in punitive dissociation a prisoner
will fail to earn one day's remission. 24 Conviction in disciplinary
court may also trigger a transfer up to higher security, substantially
delay transfer down to lesser security and limit access to socials and
family visits2 Perhaps most damaging of all, conviction in disci-
plinary court may fatally undermine a prisoner's prospects for
parole or other form of conditional release 2
24 C.D. 6oo.2.o6.r, 1985-03-29. Prisoners do not appear personally before the
Earned Remission Board. The Board's assessment of the gravity of the offence
for remission purposes is based upon a review of the charging officer's written
offence report plus any personal knowledge Board members may have of
the offence. They do not review any transcript of the disciplinary hearing;
therefore they may not be aware of mitigating factors which the independent
chairperson may have taken into account. The Board does not feel bound
by the sentence of the disciplinary court in making its decision. Cases in
which the independent chairperson gave lenient sentences frequently were
visited with serious consequences by the Earned Remission Board. The
Board's procedures raise serious legal issues relating to lack of fairness and
double jeopardy.
25 A prisoner who is convicted of a serious or intermediary offence is not
eligible for transfer to lesser security or to family visits for a period of six
months. For minor offences the period is three months. In practice, the
periods may be much longer.
20 For prisoners serving very long sentences (and particularly for those serving
life sentences to which remission does not apply) the effect of a disciplinary
conviction on transfer and conditional release overshadows all others. Within
the Canadian correctional system there exists a process referred to as
"cascading" whereby a prison is expected to cascade down through the
hierarchy of the seven security levels. The rigours of the prison regime and
the extent of the restrictions on a prisoner's institutional liberty are related
to the security level of the institution. Except under the most exceptional
circumstances a prisoner will not be granted any form of conditional release
program while in a maximum security institution. For prisoners in the S-6
Kent Institution or the S-.9 Matsqui Institution a disciplinary conviction
which delays their transfer down or precipitates their transfer up the
security ladder will directly affect their prospects for return to the com-
munity on a conditional release program.
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CORRECTIONAL
LAW: A STUDY OF EVOLUTION
The first independent chairpersons were appointed to preside
over disciplinary hearings of serious offences in maximum security
institutions in 1977. In 1979 the Supreme Court, in Martineau
(No. 2),17 definitively ruled that prison disciplinary proceedings
were subject to the common law duty to act fairly. That same year
the Commissioner's Directives were amplified to reflect the Cor-
rectional Service of Canada's understanding of the procedural im-
plications of Martineau. That amplification contained for the first
time a specific reference to representation by counsel. Annex A to
the Commissioner's Directive provided:
Occasions have arisen where an accused has made a formal or
informal demand that he be represented by counsel. Such demands
shall be met with the response that he is not entitled to counsel,
and that the hearing will proceed without the accused person being
represented.28
This exclusionary provision was the subject of judicial scrutiny
in a series of cases before the Federal Court in 1981 and 1982, the
common result of which was a determination that since a disciplin-
ary hearing must be conducted in accordance with the duty to act
fairly, the independent chairperson had a discretion to permit repre-
sentation by counsel where it was necessary to ensure a fair hearing.
To the extent that the Commissioner's Directive sought to apply a
blanket policy of exclusion of counsel it was not legally effective to
limit the chairperson's discretion. The courts made it clear that they
were not creating a right to counsel and that the circumstances in
which counsel would be necessary were circumscribed by the nature
of prison justice. In Re Davidson and Disciplinary Board of Prison
for Women and King,2" Cattanach J. stated:
The very nature of a prison is such [that] prison officers must make
immediate decisions, the disobedience of which by inmates will
necessarily result in charges being laid and restrictions and penalties
imposed. This is essential and must be made as part of the routine
process. Disobedience to legitimate orders in this regard must be
followed by swift and certain punishment. If the powers and
authority of the prison officers are curbed and the deterrent of
27 Supra, note 6.
28 Annex A to CD#213, 17 May 1979.
29 (i98i) 61 C.C.C. (2d) 52o (F.C.TMD.).
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speedy and sure punishment removed the consequences will be
chaotic.30
As to the circumstances where fairness would require representa-
tion by counsel, Cattanach J. had this to say:
For my part I find it difficult to envision circumstances where, upon
a trial for breach of military or prison discipline, the presence of
counsel is essential to ensure that the duty of fairness is observed.
These breaches of discipline in by far the greater number of cases
are simply questions of fact. Did the soldier or inmate do the act
alleged? In few instances are there questions of law involved.
In this instance the presiding officer of the Disciplinary Court was a
barrister and solicitor.... Being qualified as she is, I am certain
that, before convicting the applicant of the offence with which she
was charged, the presiding officer satisfied herself that every in-
gredient essential to the charge was established.31
In Re Blanchard and Disciplinary Board of Millhaven Institu-
tion' Addy J. expressed this view on legal representation for a
prisoner before the disciplinary court:
There is no right to counsel; whether counsel representing the
prisoner is to be allowed to be present is a matter for the discretion
of the chairman conducting the inquiry. Occasions might possibly
arise where matters are so complicated from a legal standpoint that
the duty to act fairly might require the presence of counsel, but I
cannot at the moment envisage such a situation, especially where
the person conducting the inquiry is a legally qualified barrister and
solicitor, as in the present case. Furthermore, the questions arising
in these disciplinary proceedings are, generally, of a factual nature.
The prisoner must be mentally and physically capable of under-
standing the proceedings and the nature and details of the accusa-
30 Id. at 534.
31 Id. at 535. This view of the limited role of counsel in prison disciplinary
proceedings bears a remarkable similarity to the common law position
regarding criminal proceedings in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As
described by Professor Baker,
The defendant could not have the assistance of counsel in presenting his
case, unless there was a point of law arising on the indictment; since the
point of law had to be assigned before counsel was allowed, the un-
learned defendant had little chance of professional help. This harsh rule
was defended on the grounds that... the judges would... ensure that
the trial proceeded according to law. Another reason, if not expressly
articulated, was the fear that trials would be lengthened if advocates took
part. If counsel were allowed, it was pointed out with some alarm in
i6o2, every prisoner would want it.
See L. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2d. ed. (1979) at
417.
32 (1982) 69 C.C.C. (2d) 171 (F.C.T.D.).
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tions, of taking cognizance of any oral or written evidence presented,
of questioning witnesses and of presenting his version of the matter.
Where there is any doubt as to the prisoner's capability to so take
part in the proceedings, then, in order to act fairly, the chairman
must first satisfy himself on that issue before proceeding with the
hearing.33
It is important to note that the judgments of both Cattanach and
Addy J. J. rest on three tacit assumptions, the validity of which I will
be examining later: (i) Legal representation in prison disciplinary
hearings would undermine the efficacy of punishment; (2) most
cases turn on questions of fact, therefore advocacy skills are not
required; and (3) the legal expertise of the decision maker is
sufficient to ensure proper consideration of jurisprudential principles
favouring the accused's case.
In the United Kingdom the law has developed in a similar pro-
gression, from total exclusion of counsel to one of discretionary
admission where required by the fairness principle. In 1975 in
Fraser v. Mudge,34 a decision of the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning
M.R. stated, in rejecting the argument that the prisoner had a right
to counsel:
If legal representation were allowed, it would mean considerable
delay. So also with breaches of prison discipline. They must be heard
and decided speedily. Those who hear the cases must, of course, act
fairly. They must let the man know the charge and give him a
proper opportunity of presenting his case. But that can be done
and is done without the matter being held up for legal representation.
I do not think we ought to alter the existing practice85
However, nine years later the Divisional Court, in R. v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department ex parte Tarrantr held that,
while Fraser v. Mudge stands for the proposition that a prisoner
has no absolute right to counsel, the disciplinary court has authority
to exercise a discretion to allow counsel. Webster J., in the course of
his judgment, gave a list of six matters for consideration in exercis-
ing such a discretion: (i) the seriousness of the charge and of the
potential penalty; (2) the likelihood of any points of law arising;
(3) the capacity of the particular person to present his own case;
(4) procedural difficulties; (5) the need for reasonable speed in
3 Id. at 172. See also Minott v. Presiding Officer of the Inmate Disciplinary
Court of Stony Mountain Penitentiary [1982] 1 F.C. 322 (F.C.T.D.).
34 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1132 (C.A.).
35 Id. at 1133-34.
36 [1984] 2 W.L.R. 613.
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making the adjudication; and (6) the need for fairness as among
prisoners and between prisoners and prison officers.
The Canadian and English position as reflected in the Davidson
and Tarrant cases respectively was less restrictive than the position
taken by the United States Supreme Court in its decision in Wolff v.
McDonnell37 There the Court said, on the issue of the right of the
prisoner to counsel:
The insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process would in-
evitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to
reduce their utility as a means to further correctional goals. There
would also be delay and very practical problems in providing
counsel in sufficient numbers at the time and place where hearings
are to be held. At this stage of the development of these procedures
we are not prepared to hold that inmates have a right to either
retained or appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings.3
One of the intriguing things about the evolution of Canadian
correctional law is the way in which judicial developments in the
area of the internal management of the police have been followed
by a parallel development in the management of Canada's prisons.
Thus the recognition of the duty to act fairly in prison decision
making reflected in Martineau (No. 2) was heralded by the prior
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Nicholson v. Haldi
mand-Norfolk Regional Bd. of Commissioners of Police,79 a case
dealing with the internal management of a police force. We can
now observe a similar progression in the right to counsel cases.
In Re Husted and Ridley and The Queen" two R.C.M.P. officers
were charged with major service offences. Under the R.C.M.P. Act
the punishments authorized ranged from imprisonment up to one
year, a fine of not more than $500, loss of thirty days' pay, reduction
in rank, loss of seniority, or a reprimand. The officers were brought
before an R.C.M.P. Service Court and denied representation by
counsel. Addy J. ruled the constables were entitled to counsel be-
37 418 U.S. 539 (973).
31 Id. at 57 o . As noted by Thurlow C.J. in Howard, supra, note io at 259,
the Supreme Court in Wolff pointed out that, under the relevant Nebraska
statute, the loss of remission, which was the disciplinary sanction at issue,
would not necessarily extend the prisoner's time in prison because there
was authority in the correctional authorities to restore lost good time.
However, under the current Canadian statutory scheme, earned remission
once forfeited cannot be restored, which makes the decision of the disci-
plinary court a final and irrevocable deprivation of the right to liberty.
30 [1979] 1 S.C.R. 31i, (1978) 88D.L.R. (3d) 671.
40 (1981) 5 8 C.C.C. (2d) x5 6, 2 F.C.s (T.D.).
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cause of the following factors: (i) the interests at stake were high;
(2) the potential penalties were serious; and (3) the nature of the
proceedings was formal. He further ruled that the Regulations
made under the R.C.M.P. Act which purported to preclude a right
to counsel were ultra vires. In the course of his judgment he re-
viewed the competing policy concerns raised by this issue:
There is no absolute common law right to counsel in all cases where
an individual is subject to some penalty. The Courts have consis-
tently refused to intervene on the grounds that representation by
counsel was denied in certain service disciplinary matters where the
hearing is, by the nature of the subject-matter or the alleged offence,
of an internal administrative nature and concerns a disciplinary
matter within a special body such as a branch of the armed
services or a police organization .... In most of these cases it has
generally been long established by custom that such disciplinary
matters would be settled within the force or organization, informally
and without outside intervention.... The exigencies of the service
require this degree of informality without which the day to day
administration of the force and the maintenance of discipline within
it would become so cumbersome and time-consuming as to be in-
effective. On the other hand, the common law recognizes that
wherever a person's liberty or livelihood is at stake in a legal trial,
he should not unreasonably be deprived of the services of the duly
qualified legal counsel of his choice unless the employment of any
particular counsel would unduly delay or impede the administration
of justice. It is a natural corollary of the principle that an accused
is entitled to a full and fair defence. 4
In Joplin v. Chief Constable of Vancouver Police Department42
a Vancouver police officer was charged with being discourteous to
a member of the public. Under the relevant regulations he was
subject to a maximum fine of $2oo and suspension without pay for
five days, but could not be dismissed, required to resign, or reduced
in rank. Section 18(2) of the Police (Disciplinary) Regulations
contains special provisions relating to representation by counsel.
While permitting such representation in a case where the offence
carried a penalty of dismissal, requirement to resign or a reduction
in rank, it denies police officers the right to counsel in other cases.
While the challenge to the regulation was based broadly on sec-
tion 7 of the Charter McEachern C.J. dealt with the case within
the context of the common law principle of fairness. The Chief jus-
tice concluded that section i8(2) was ultra vires because the
41 Id. at 159-6o.
42 [1983] 2 W.W.R. 52, 44 D.L.R. (3d) 285 (B.C.S.O.).
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Legislature could not be assumed to have conferred upon the
Lieutenant Governor-in-Council the power to make regulations
which were unjust or unfair. In concluding that the denial of repre-
sentation by counsel in this class of case was unfair the Chief Justice
stated:
I do not think it possible to treat any disciplinary proceedings under
this Disciplinary Code (except those conducted formally on a
man-to-man basis where no entry is made in an officer's record) as
other than serious... where good conduct is obviously an important
.actor in promotion and therefore in salary.... If a senior officer
of this police force considers the complaint serious enough to engage
this formal hearing procedure with its full panoply of legalities, then
it is per se serious, and this is so regardless of the nature of the
alleged offence or the maximum penalty which is recommended. I
prefer to look broadly at the nature of the proceedings, and the
consequences or potential consequences of those proceedings rather
than just the form of the regulations in deciding what is serious....
When the Lieutenant Governor in Council established a formal
legal procedure he could not, with fairness, leave out the most
important safeguard in the legal process, that is, the right to counsel.
I am satisfied that justice and fairness cannot tolerate a procedure
where a layman is expected to deal with legal concepts which are
strange to him, and at the same time advise himself objectively.4 3
Prisoners sought to apply the principles of Husted and Joplin to
prison discipline in the case of Re Howard and Presiding Officer
of Inmate Disciplinary Court of Stony Mountain Institution.
On 31 December 1982, Howard was involved in an incident
with officers at Stony Mountain Institution, as a result of which
five serious charges were laid against him. These were possession of
contraband, using indecent or disrespectful language, doing an act
calculated to prejudice discipline or good order, disobeying a lawful
order and threatening to assault. The first three offences occurred
at 8:40, the fourth at nine o'clock and the fifth at 9:20, all on the
same day. On January 6 Howard appeared before the disciplinary
court and pleaded guilty to two of the charges and entered pleas of
not guilty on the remaining three. He was subsequently charged
with two further counts, possession of contraband on January 4 and
failure to obey a lawful order on January 18. On January 20 he
was interviewed by a legal aid lawyer and subsequently had legal
aid counsel appointed to represent him with respect to the proceed-
43 Id. at 67-68. McEachern C.J.'s judgment was approved by the B.C. Court
of Appeal [1985] 4 W.W.R. 538, so Admin. L.R. 204. See also Re
Bachinsky and Sawyer [1974] 1 W.W.R. 295, (973) 43 D.L.R. (3d) 96(Alta S.C.).
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ings before the independent chairperson. On February 3, his next
court appearance, he was granted an adjournment in order to allow
his counsel time to prepare a written submission on the issue of
having counsel represent him at the hearing. Further adjournments
were granted to permit representations from the Department of
Justice.
After considering the written representations, the independent
chairperson issued written reasons denying the applicant the right
to be represented by counsel. In those reasons the independent
chairperson rejected the arguments made by Howard's counsel that
sections 7 and ii (d) of the Charter now guaranteed a right to
counsel at disciplinary board hearings. He concluded that the
Davidson decision still accurately stated the relevant law regarding
representation by counsel and the issue therefore was whether repre-
sentation ought to be allowed in order to ensure a fair hearing. On
this question he concluded: "I have not been persuaded that there
exists any circumstances in this particular case which preclude the
possibility of a fair hearing in the absence of counsel. Therefore I
exercise my discretion in denying the application of Howard to be
represented by counsel at the hearing."
Howard then sought an order from the Federal Court prohibiting
the independent chairperson from continuing the hearing in the
absence of legal counsel. Howard argued that the Husted and
Joplin line of cases, buttressed by section 7 of the Charter, now
gave the prisoner the right to be represented by counsel in a case
where he was charged with a serious offence for which he could be
subjected to loss of remission or punitive dissociation. In refusing
the order, Nitikman J. distinguished Joplin and Husted principally
on the basis that both the R.C.M.P. and the Vancouver Police
Disciplinary Codes contain provisions which incorporated into the
hearing the rules of evidence which were specifically excluded in
the Commissioner's Directives dealing with prison disciplinary of-
fences. As to the Charter argument, Nitikman J. held that section 7,
while constitutionally entrenching common law rights to fairness,
did not create a new principle of law insofar as to the right to
counsel was concerned.45
4 (1984) 8 c.c.c. (3d) 557,4 D.L.R. (4th) 147 (F.C.T.D.).
45 His Lordship rejected the alternative argument made by Howard that sec-
tion i i(d), which provides that any person charged with an offence has
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, also
carried with it the right to be represented by legal counsel. Mr. Justice
Nitikman rejected this argument principally on the basis that the definition
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Two days after Mr. Justice Nitikman's refusal to grant the order
of prohibition the hearing against Howard proceeded and, having
been found guilty on six of the seven counts, he was sentenced to
forfeit seventy days of his earned remission.
The case was then appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal
where the Court overruled the trial judge, holding that Howard was
entitled to counsel for defence of the charges against him. As
stated by the Chief Justice, the issue before the Appeal Court was
"solely whether the appellant had an undeniable right to counsel
and more particularly whether section 7 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms guaranteed him that right." 47
Chief Justice Thurlow held that the case attracted section 7 of
the Charter in that Howard's liberty was at stake because his earned
remission was in jeopardy in the disciplinary hearing of a serious
charge. Howard had also argued that his security of the person
was in jeopardy in that solitary confinement was also one of the
possible sanctions for serious offences. The Chief Justice, without
rejecting this argument, felt it sufficient to deal with the case solely
on the basis of the liberty interest involved in the loss of remission.
As to the effect of section 7, the Chief Justice had this to say:
I am of the opinion that the enactment of s. 7 has not created any
absolute right to counsel in all such proceedings. It is undoubtedly
of the greatest importance to a person whose life, liberty or security
of the person are at stake to have the opportunity to present his case
as fully and adequately as possible. The advantages of having the
assistance of counsel for that purpose are not in doubt. But what is
required is an opportunity to present the case adequately and I do
not think it can be affirmed that in no case can such an opportunity
be afforded without also as part of it affording the right to represen-
tation by counsel at the hearing.
Once that position is reached it appears to me that whether or
not the person has a right to representation by counsel will depend
on the circumstances of the particular case, its nature, its gravity,
its complexity and the capacity of the inmate himself to understand
the case and present his defence. The list is not exhaustive. And
of an offence in section i i did not include an inmate disciplinary offence,
following in this regard the decision of Toy J. in R. v. Mingo (1982)
2 C.C.C. (3d) 23 (B.C.S.C.). There are competing lines of authority on this
issue; see Peltari v. Director of Lower Mainland Correctional Centre (i984)
42 C.R. (3d) 103 (B.C.S.C.) for a review of the authorities. See also
H. Kushner, "Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section i i- Disciplinary
Hearings Before Statutory Tribunals" (984) 62 Can. Bar Rev. 638. Counsel
for Howard did not pursue this argument on appeal.
40 Supra, note so.
47 Id. at 250.
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from this, it seems to me, it follows that whether or not an inmate's
request for representation by counsel can lawfully be refused is not
properly referred to as a matter of discretion but is a matter of right
where the circumstances are such that the opportunity to present
the case adequately calls for representation by counsel. 48
The significance of the shift in the characterization from one of
discretion to one of a prisoner's right to counsel where the circum-
stances are such that it is necessary for the proper presentation of
the case is highlighted in a later part of the judgment where its
impact on the respective roles of the independent chairperson and
the court is described:
[The independent chairperson] will no doubt have to consider and
take a position on whether the case is one in which the request for
counsel can be denied. And he must be prepared to act on his view.
But, in my opinion, his denial of such a request cannot be regarded
as an adjudication of the right and cannot prevent a superior court
in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction from determining the
question on its own. I may note as well that for a presiding officer
to decide that he can accord the inmate a fair hearing in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice without permitting counsel
would seem to me to indicate that he already has preconceived
ideas about the case and the defence and that the need to decide
would put him in the embarrassing position of determining his
own capacity to accord the inmate his rights without knowing what
they are. That, in my view, makes him an unsuitable person to
decide such a question.4 9
As to whether the particular circumstances in the Howard case
required representation by counsel, the Chief Justice concluded
that they did.
[T]he whole of the appellant's 267 days of earned remission were
in jeopardy. In my view that alone suggests his need of counsel.
Next there is the lack of particulars of offences of which three are
alleged to have occurred at the same instant. Convictions on the
two of the charges to which he pleaded not guilty might result in
consecutive losses of 3o days' remission without reference to the
commissioner for what not inconceivably may have been the same
act. Moreover, one of the three charges is that of an act calculated
to prejudice discipline and good order, a notoriously vague and
difficult charge for anyone to defend. These features, as well, suggest
the need for counsel to protect the inmate.
There is not in the record anything that would indicate that the
appellant suffered from physical or mental incapacity which would
48 Id. at 262-63.
49 Id. at 263-64.
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disable him from conducting his own defence as well as might be
expected of any ordinary person without legal training. But he
obviously felt the need for counsel because he obtained legal aid
assistance promptly.... Moreover, in a social system which recog-
nizes the right of anyone to counsel in any of the ordinary courts
of law for the defence of any charge, no matter how trivial the
possible consequences may be, it seems to me to be incongruous to
deny such a right to a person who, though not suffering from any
physical or mental incapacity to defend himself, is faced with
charges that may result in a loss of his liberty, qualified and fragile
though it may have been, for some 267 days.50
In a separate concurring judgment MacGuigan J.A. traced the
developments in the disciplinary system since the Supreme Court
rendered its judgment in Martineau (No. 2) (principally the ap-
pointment of independent chairpersons) for the purpose of address-
ing Howard's argument that Mr. Justice Dickson's statement that
"Can inmate disciplinary board is not a court" was no longer an
appropriate characterization of the disciplinary process in 1984.
On this point he concluded that although the changes in the Peni-
tentiary Regulations and the Commissioner's Directives since Mar-
tineau were not merely nominal,
[I] t would be excessive to view them as having already created a
court. There is no prosecution in the strict sense and no prosecuting
officer. The presiding officer, who is assisted by two correctional
officers whose unusual function was rationalized by Cattanach J.
in Davidson as being like that of "assessors in Admiralty action
before the Federal Court of Canada", has something of an inquisi-
torial role. Certainly, the whole procedure lacks a fully adversarial
character.51
Furthermore, the procedural structure was still incomplete in its
legality in view of the fact that the procedure at hearings was to be
found in the Commissioner's Directives which do not have the status
of law:
In the result, while a new legal system in prison discpilinary hearings
may be in the process of evolution, it has not yet emerged. Legally
speaking, the only advance has been to a fairer version of the same
basic model considered by the Supreme Court in the two Martineau
cases.
52
MacGuigan J.A., in reviewing a number of Canadian and Ameri-
can cases, concluded:
50 Id. at 264.
51 Id. at 270.
52 Id.
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What both the Canadian and the American cases indicate is that
there are degrees of liberty, all protected in some way by a rule of
due process or natural justice or fundamental justice, but not in
the same way. What there must always be is an opportunity to state
a case which is adequate for fundamental justice in the circum-
stances. In other words, there is a sliding standard of adequacy
which can be defined only in reference to the particular degree of
liberty at stake and the particular procedural safeguard in question.
The resolution may involve the balancing of competing interests.
Here, the penitentiary setting is of capital importance in sorting
out the interests in competition. 53
His Lordship noted that in the prison,
In such an atmosphere of discord and hatred, minor sparks can set
off major conflagrations of the most incendiary sort. Order is both
more necessary and more fragile than in even military and police
contexts, and its restoration, when disturbed, becomes a matter of
frightening immediacy.
It would be an ill-informed court that was not aware of the
necessity for immediate response by prison authorities to breaches
of prison order and it would be a rash one that would deny them the
means to react effectively.
But not every feature of present disciplinary practice is objectively
necessary for immediate discpilinary purposes. The mere conven-
ience of the authorities will serve as no justification; as Lord Atkin
put it in Gen. Medical Council v. Spackman... "Convenience and
justice are often not on speaking terms." Even what may be neces-
sary but nevertheless delayable cannot be given priority. All that
is not immediately necessary must certainly yield to the fullest
exigencies of liberty.
On the basis of these criteria of necessity and immediacy, on-
the-spot administrative dissociation may arguably be required to
segregate inmates involved, e.g., in hostage-taking, but punitive
dissociation as a consequence of a disciplinary court has much less
immediate necessity, and revocation of earned remission seems not
to be immediately necessary at all.54
In MacGuigan J.A.'s judgment, section 7 had the legal effect of
enhancing the previous requirement stressed in the fairness cases
of an adequate opportunity of answering the charge. 5 Whether it
53 Id. at 277.
54 Id. at 277-78.
55 Id. at 28o. The court's conclusion that s. 7 enhanced the procedural content
of the common law duty to act fairly has been developed in a number of
lower court decisions dealing with the parole process. See also Re Cadeddu
and The Queen (1983) 4 0.C.C. (3d) 97, 40 O.R. (2d) 128 (H.C.);
Collins v. Lussier [1983] 1 F.C. 218, 6 C.R.R. 89 (T.D.). See F. O'Connor,
"The Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Parole
in Canada" (1985) io Queen's L.J. 336.
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necessitated representation by counsel in any set of circumstances
was dependent upon a full analysis of the circumstances. In this
regard, His Lordship referred to the considerations listed by Web-
ster J. in the Tarrant case. Dealing with the specifics of the Howard
case, MacGuigan J.A. pointed to several factors requiring the
presence of counsel.
One of the charges... that of conduct "calculated to prejudice the
discipline of good order of the Institution" is a catch-all charge of
such vagueness that the need for counsel to clarify the facts and to
challenge the arguments is strikingly apparent, but counsel is hardly
less necessary to deal with charges such as being "indecent, dis-
respectful or threatening" in "actions, language or writing", or
possessing "contraband", which is defined as anything that an
inmate is not permitted to have in his possession. Even the charges
of disobeying a lawful order or threatening to assault another per-
son can easily give rise to legal issues of some complexity. On the
two guilty pleas counsel may have been necessary to plead exonerat-
ing factors56
MacGuigan J.A. disagreed with Webster J. in Tarrant that one of
the relevant factors should be the capacity of the particular prisoner
to present his own case. The basis of the disagreement here lay in
the fact that "no presiding officer could be in a position, at the out-
set of the disciplinary proceedings, to make a summary judgment
of such a kind before a prisoner had been heard by him.""
In response to the question which naturally springs to mind from
reading the Howard case as to what circumstances would not
necessitate counsel, MacGuigan J.A. in his judgment gave this
sweeping answer:
In sum, other than, perhaps, in fact situations of unique simplicity,
I cannot imagine cases where a possible penalty of earned remission
would not bring into play the necessity for counsel. Indeed, in my
view the probability that counsel will be required for an adequate
hearing on charges with such consequences is so strong as to amount
effectively to a presumption in favour of counsel, a departure from
which a presiding officer would have to justify. The right-enhancing
effect of the Charter thus greatly increases the ambit of protection
afforded.58
Neither MacGuigan J.A. nor Thurlow C.J. felt it necessary to
address the question of whether any limits on the right to counsel
" Supra, note io at 283.
57 Td.
58 Id.
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could be justified under section I of the Charter, since the Depart-
ment of Justice had not sought to discharge any onus to demon-
strate the existence of reasonable limits. Howard is under appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
IV. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER HOWARD: THE
MAKING OF A FAIR PROCEDURE OR THE
BREAKING OF PRISON DISCIPLINE
The Howard case was decided with the backdrop of a single
cluster of facts. The adjudication of legal principle in the crucible
of a specific case is of course regarded as a strength of the common
law tradition. But the individual trouble case can never give us
more than a legal fix on part of the correctional reality. It is here
that empirical legal research can play a significant role. The ability
to view the full flow of cases over time in different institutions, both
medium and maximum security, can provide a closer approximation
to the spectrum of the disciplinary process. Such a spectrum analysis
can in this way supplement the fixed point on which judicial
scrutiny is focused.
Before locating Howard in the daily practices of prison justice,
it is instructive to review the application of the pre-Howard legal
position on representation by counsel. As I have explained, that
legal position, established since 1981 through the Davidson line of
cases was that, notwithstanding the provision in the Commissioner's
Directives to the contrary, the independent chairperson had a
discretion to permit representation by counsel where such represen-
tation was necessary to ensure a fair hearing. On the basis of my
observations of disciplinary courts from 1983 to 1985 this legal
principle did not influence the practice of the independent chair-
persons at either Kent or Matsqui. On those occasions when a
prisoner requested that he be represented by counsel, he was met
with the answer "You can't have a lawyer. The law says they can't
be here" or "Ottawa doesn't allow it". The chairpersons were,
however, prepared in these cases to adjourn the case in order to
permit the prisoner to consult with counsel. The following case
study not only illustrates the limited impact of judicial intervention
on administrative practice pre-Howard but provides some insight
into one of the categories of cases where legal representation is
essential to a fair hearing.
Prisoner Peters, on 27 July 1983, was transferred for his own
protection into the segregation unit at Kent. On August 22 he was
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charged with possession of contraband and on September 5 with
two further counts of assaulting guards. On September 13 he was
convicted of all three offences and sentenced to thirty days punitive
dissociation and fifteen days loss of remission. I was present at that
hearing and the prisoner was extremely agitated and hostile. As the
result of his conduct in the disciplinary court he was charged with
two further counts of assault, a third count of threatening to assault
and a fourth count of being indecent, disrespectful and threatening
in his language. On September 22 the prisoner had a brief telephone
interview with a legal aid lawyer and requested that she represent
him. The lawyer then wrote to the independent chairperson in the
following terms:
I spoke to Mr. Peters by telephone on 22nd September and frankly
I am concerned about the state of his mental health. He was un-
able to communicate with me the nature of his charges, but did
instruct me that he wished me to represent him at the hearing of
these offences. I understand that Mr. Peters has been in segrega-
tion since the end of July and perhaps his present confused state is
a result of this continued isolation. In any event, I am concerned
about his ability to properly defend himself in these matters and
would appreciate it if you could contact me to see what arrange-
ments can be made. °°
On October 4 Peters appeared before the independent chairperson.
What follows is taken from the transcript of that hearing:
CHAIRPERSON: Well, what you're saying is that you are requesting a
lawyer for legal aid, isn't that right?
PRISONER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: The other judge's notes say remanded until today to
see a lawyer. And you haven't seen a lawyer?
PRISONER: They came in yesterday and I was told she was kept
waiting 45 minutes.
CHAIRPERSON: Well that's not relevant. The question is, did you
see her?
PRISONER: No. I put the request in; because of the situation
here she didn't see me.
CHAIRPERSON: What do you expect to gain from seeing a lawyer?
It's a matter of evidence. Did you or didn't you?
Are you going to get witnesses? The main thing in a
court is witnesses.
PRISONER: I'd just like some advice as to the best approach.
V) Letter from Sasha Pawliuk, 27 September z983.
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CHAIRPERSON: Well, I can advise you right here.
PRISONER: I don't understand all the implications involved in
Warden's Court and I get pretty upset when people
start going over my 'head with legal jargon. Last
time they had me in here I was spitting at the judge.
My hands were behind my back and I started getting
pretty mad. I tend to do that when I don't under-
stand all the implications.
CHAIRPERSON: The main object of a chairperson is to conduct a fair
court in a quasi-judicial hearing.... We do conduct
fair hearings. There must be fair hearings where
there are acquittals. It's a question of evidence. Now
what's a lawyer going to do? (The Chairperson then
read the letter from the legal aid lawyer and
continued)
It's not the policy of the chairpersons of this court to
allow legal counsel into the court to defend inmates
on charges. You can see legal counsel as much as
you want or as much as is available, preceding court,
but legal counsel has up until now in this court not
been allowed in and we base that on the ruling of
Judge Cattanach of the Federal Court in the David-
son case. So as far as a lawyer coming in, I'm not
allowing that. O.K., we're back to "have you had a
fair chance to speak to your lawyer?" That becomes
the question. Now you must have talked to your
lawyer by phone.
PRISONER: For approximately five minutes.
CHAIRPERSON: From that she gathers you can't defend yourself.
But I'm not overawed by that.
PRISONER: I haven't seen her. I'd like to see her.
CHAIRPERSON: I think I'm conducting a fair hearing. She's asked
about coming in. I won't be going along with that
request but I'll consider your request to speak to
your lawyer verbally eight days from now.
The case was then adjourned to permit the prisoner to see legal
counsel. On October i8, in the absence of counsel, Peters was con-
victed of one of the counts of assault and sentenced to thirty days
punitive dissociation. On the first of November, again in the absence
of counsel, he was convicted of the other count of assault, being
indecent or disrespectiful and threatening to assault, and sentenced
to three consecutive terns of thirty days in punitive dissociation."0
60 These disciplinary decisions were challenged in federal court on the basis
that the chairperson had failed to exercise the discretion vested in him to
allow counsel. The Department of Justice conceded that the independent
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The Peters case well illustrates one class of case in which prisoners,
by virtue of their mental state, are unable to represent themselves
effectively and where the representation by counsel is an essential
prerequisite to a fair hearing. In some cases, as in Peters, there is a
history of psychiatric illness exacerbated by a long period in adminis-
trative or punitive dissociation. 1 For some prisoners like Peters this
manifests itself at the hearing in aggressive behaviour leading to
yet more disciplinary charges. In others, prejudice to a fair hearing
is not caused by the prisoner's intransigence and hostility but rather
a total apathy that anything he could say or do could influence
his fate.
2
The next case study illustrates both the nature of the prejudice
suffered by a prisoner unable to adequately represent himself and
points up the ways in which representation by counsel would avoid
that prejudice. Prisoner Redwood first appeared in disciplinary
court on ii August 1983, facing seven charges arising out of an
incident which occurred a week earlier. The charges were:
(I) 213o hours: Contraband shampoo bottle filled with strong
smelling substance.
chairperson had misapplied the Davidson case and advised Kent Institution
to release Peters from punitive dissociation on December 13, at which point
he had already served over eight weeks in solitary confinement. The lack of
familiarity by the independent chairpersons at Kent and Matsqui with
federal court decisions directly related to the discharge of their offices,
which this case so clearly reveals, was not limited to the Davidson ruling.
In June j983 Collier J. in Re Blanquiere and Director of Matsqui Institu-
tion (1983) 6 C.C.C. (3d) 293 (F.C.T.D.) ruled that the duty to act
fairly required that prior to passing sentence the independent chairperson
must give prisoners an opportunity to make submissions as to sentence. In
several cases at Kent prisoners were not asked whether they wished to make
submissions and in one case when a prisoner stated "I want to say something
about sentence. It's my fate." the independent chairperson replied, "No.
You've had a good kick at the cat." and ordered him to leave the room
while he sought the advise of the advisers.
01 The distinction between the two forms of dissociation is this: punitive dis-
sociation can only be imposed for breach of a disciplinary offence and for a
specific period. Administrative dissociation can only be authorized by a
warden pursuant to s. 40 of the Regulations where the warden deems it
necessary "for the maintenance of good order and discipline and in the
best interests of an inmate." There is no maximum term, but the prisoner's
case must be reviewed every thirty days. In practice, prisoners in either
punitive or administrative dissociation are kept in the same unit and live
under the same regime save that prisoners in administrative dissociation are
permitted televisions and radios in their cells. For a further discussion see
Jackson, supra, note 9.
62 In one case I observed, the prisoner, having been found guilty of possession
of a sharpened knife, was sentenced to thirty days in dissociation, no men-
tion being made by the advisers of the fact that the prisoner had tried to
kill himself a few days before the hearing nor of the fact that he had spent
the twenty days prior to the hearing in solitary confinement.
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(2) 2135 hours: Ordered to lock up and did not.
(3) 2155 hours: Refused direct order to lock up, suspected of being
under the influence.
(4) 2155 hours: When ordered to lock up, was threatening in his
actions.
(5) 2155 hours: Was indecent and disrespectful when ordered to
lock up.
(6) 2155 hours: Was threatening in his actions towards another.
(7) 163o hours (next day): Assault on another person: spat on
officer through the slot of solitary confinement cell when officer
was reading charges (i) to (6).
When the handcuffed prisoner was brought into the hearing room
he was angry and threatening. The following transcript is taken
from my notes of the hearing:
CHAIRPERSON: How do you plead?
PRISONER: I don't think I should have to obey anyone here. I
don't have to obey every little screw that runs this
joint.
CHAIRPERSON (interjecting) : This is irrelevant.
PRISONER: You are f... ing senile.
CHAIRPERSON: We have multiple charges here. I will talk to the
Warden and see what can be done.
PRISONER: I'd like to explain something.
CHAIRPERSON: Well, you wouldn't talk before.
PRISONER: I do want to now. I want to explain but you wouldn't
give me a chance.
CHAIRPERSON: I'll talk to the Warden and resume the hearing in
the afternoon.
The hearing was resumed after lunch.
CHAIRPERSON: I've talked to the Warden and we have decided to
proceed with the case. I recommended that three of
the charges be withdrawn. He agreed. Multiple
charges are inappropriate. We are withdrawing
charges #2, 3 and 6.
Dealing first with the contraband charge, how do
you plead?
PRISONER: I don't want to take part.
CHAIRPERSON: Enter a plea of not guilty (at this point the prisoner
attempted to leave the hearing room. He was given
a direct order by his escorting officer to remain.)
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PRISONER: I don't care if you give me fifty charges, but don't
I have a right to seek legal counsel?
CHAIRPERSON: You are challenging the jurisdiction of the court?
PRISONER: I want legal counsel.
CHAIRPERSON: The rule for legal counsel is that it is provided only
if you don't understand the legal issues.
PRISONER: I don't understand any of the issues.
CHAIRPERSON: You don't have a right to counsel in these circum-
stances. Not at this stage. I'm not convinced you're
sincere. You are trying to frustrate the court.
PRISONER: I am the one who is frustrated. I am the one that was
left in the hole for three hours naked. (The prisoner
became very agitated and was escorted out of the
room by an officer.)
CHAIRPERSON: What shall we do - shackle him?
ADVISER: There'll be one hell of a fight if we do.
CHAIRPERSON: I see no choice but to proceed without him.
At this point I suggested to the chairperson that he might consider
adjourning the case for a week in order to permit the prisoner to
consult with a legal aid lawyer. The independent chairperson agreed
to the procedure and adjourned the case.
After the hearing a further charge was laid against Redwood
arising from his conduct during the hearing in that he was indecent,
disrespectful or threatening in his language. The hearing on the
original four outstanding charges was resumed on August 31,
again without counsel. As various officers testified the prisoner
became more and more agitated. When given an opportunity to
cross-examine he called the witnesses f... ing liars. During the
evidence of one guard in particular the prisoner became extremely
abusive and started to move towards the officer but was physically
restrained by his escorts. On the charge of spitting at an officer the
prisoner stated that he wished to call as a witness a prisoner who
was in the cell next to him in the segregation unit to give evidence
that the officer had deliberately taunted and provoked him. The
independent chairperson asked the clerk whether the prisoner had
filed a written request to call a witness and when informed that he
had not he disallowed the prisoner's oral request. The independent
chairperson then stated, "There being no defence and no witnesses,
I find you guilty." The prisoner responded angrily, "You just
kangarooed me, you f... ing old fart. You senile bugger." The
prisoner was not asked whether he had any submissions on sentenc-
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ing and after a discussion with the advisers, in the absence of the
prisoner, he was brought back into the room and sentenced to a
total of sixty days in punitive dissociation. A week later, on Septem-
ber 8, he was sentenced to a further consecutive fifteen days puni-
tive together with forfeiture of ten days remission on the charge of
being disrespectful to the judge.
It is my opinion that, had this prisoner been afforded the right to
legal representation, the case would have proceeded quite differently.
The prisoner would have had the opportunity to speak to his lawyer
before the proceedings to discuss the precise nature of the charges
and to discuss the possible defences. Given that there were multiple
charges arising from the same incident, the lawyer would no doubt
have spoken to the warden about the unfairness of this and some of
the charges would have been dropped by consent before the hearing
started.63 All of this pre-hearing work would have given the prisoner
some confidence that his interests were being safeguarded and would
likely have diffused his anger and frustration. If counsel was not
successful in this regard he would at least have been able to make a
submission for an adjournment on the basis that his client was not
in a proper state of mind to proceed with the hearing, thus avoiding
the charges that were laid arising out of the prisoner's abusive con-
duct at the first hearing. Assuming that the hearing had proceeded,
counsel and not the prisoner would have conduct of the defence.
Cross-examination would have consisted of something more than a
tirade against the officers.
In my discussions with the prisoner after the hearing he told me
that the reason he had got particularly abusive and threatening
63 The issue of multiple charges was the subject matter of judicial comment
in the case of Lasalle v. Disciplinary Tribunal of Leclerc Institute (1983)
37 C.R. ( 3 d) 147 (F.O.T.D.). Lasalle, while in a state of advanced intoxi-
cation, was involved in an altercation with prison staff. On March 7 he
was charged with being in an abnormal state and assaulting an officer. On
March 9 he was charged with threatening staff, and on March i i with
disobeying an order. In the course of his judgment Walsh J. stated at 155,
"There is no valid or reasonable explanation as to why [the third and
fourth charges] were not laid at the same time as the initial charges, if, in
fact, there is any justification for laying an excessive number of charges
arising out of the same incident." The 1985 Divisional Instruction on Disci-
pline now contains specific provisions dealing with this issue. Paragraph i8
provides that "Where more than one misconduct constitutes an incident as
defined in paragraph 5, no more than two charges shall be laid against an
inmate. In most cases the two charges shall be the most serious breaches
of conduct." Paragraph 5 provides that "incident means an occurrence
taking place over a period of time during which an inmate has committed
misconducts that are part of a single transaction or are contemporaneous
in time to one another and which, taken together, constitute a single inva-
sion of the same legally protected interest." D.I. 600.7.03.1, July, 1985.
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towards one of the officers was because he believed this officer had
beaten one of his friends while the man was handcuffed. He said
that he could not bear to be in the same room with the officer.
Whatever the merits of the prisoner's belief, it is quite clear that
he was incapable of conducting a reasoned and restrained cross-
examination. Had counsel been present to conduct the cross-
examination the prisoner would have been distanced from the hostile
relationship with the officer. Counsel would also have been aware
of the prisoner's witness on the spitting incident and would have
interviewed that prisoner to assess whether he had relevant evi-
dence to give and if so to ensure that the requisite notice to call
the prisoner was served.
Finally counsel would have been able, in the event of a guilty
verdict, to make a submission as to sentence. As I have indicated,
the independent chairperson did not ask the prisoner whether he
had anything to say on sentence (contrary to the Blanquiere ruling),
yet there were some highly significant matters which ought to have
been raised. Redwood was a native, and prior to this incident had
been participating in native spiritual practices, particularly the pipe
ceremony, which had recently been established at Kent Institution.
The prisoner, like many of the other native prisoners at Kent, had
had little previous experience of these ceremonies. It is the belief
of native elders that helping prisoners discover or rediscover the
strengths of native spirtuality will give them healthy and non-violent
ways to respond not only to the pressures of life in prison but to
their future lives in the community. A submission on sentence by
counsel could have acquainted the chairperson with the nature of
the native spiritual program, highlighted the fact that Redwood
had already spent over a month in segregation awaiting disposition
of the charges, and argued that any more time in segregation would
be counterproductive.
There is little doubt in my mind, having spent considerable time
with Redwood since the hearing, that had he been represented by
competent counsel he would not have felt the need to engage in the
outbursts he did in the courtroom. These outbursts clearly influenced
the independent chairperson in terms of the very heavy sentences
he handed down, sentences which indeed were among the longest
given during the period of my observations.
But the cost of not having counsel is not limited to the fact that
Redwood received a far more severe sentence than his offences
warranted. The institution was left to deal with a prisoner who was
even more angry after the hearing than before and who simply
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refused to accept the legitimacy of the process. Predictably, Red-
wood's experience in punitive dissociation was stormy. Further
charges of assault (throwing water out of the cell at an officer)
and disrespectful language resulted in his being sentenced to a
further loss of thirty days remission in September. Clearly no one's
interest was served. As was astutely stated by Hufstedler J. in the
American case of Clutchette v. Procunier,64 "A prisoner who re-
ceives what he reasonably views as unfair or arbitrary treatment
from prison authorities is likely to become a difficult subject for
reformation or even for efficient custody."
65
Although the prejudice to a fair trial caused by the absence of
counsel is highlighted in cases such as Peters and Redwood where
the prisoner is mentally unstable or very frustrated, it is not limited
to such cases. The importance of counsel to the defence of a charge
or allegation of misconduct is one which the courts have acknow-
ledged. Lord Denning M.R. in Pett v. Greyhound Racing Associa-
tion Ltd.,6 in what may be regarded as the grandfather of the
modern cases on the right to be represented by counsel before an
administrative tribunal, stated:
It is not every man who has the ability to defend himself on his own.
He cannot bring out the points in his own favour or the weaknesses
in the other side. He may be tongue-tied or nervous, confused or
wanting in intelligence. He cannot examine or cross-examine wit-
nesses. We see it every day. A magistrate says to a man: "You can
ask any questions you like"; whereupon the man immediately starts
to make a speech. If justice is to be done, he ought to have the help
of someone to speak for him; and who better than a lawyer who
has been trained for the task? I should have thought, therefore, that
when a man's reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a
right to speak by his own mouth, he also has a right to speak by
counsel or solicitor 7
Mr. Justice Sutherland in the United States Supreme Court
decision on Powell v. Alabama" had developed this point some
thirty years before.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law.... He lacks both the skill and know-
ledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he may have
64 497 F. (2d) 809 (1974)-
65 Id. at 817.
66 [1968] 2 All E.R. 5 45 (C.A.).
67 Id. at 549.
68 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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the perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. 9
More recently, the United States Supreme Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly70 adopted the reasoning in Powell and allowed counsel to
represent an applicant in evidentiary hearings contesting the dis-
continuance of public welfare benefits. Brennan J. had this to say
on the importance of counsel to a fair hearing:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail, if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.... Counsel
can help to delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in
an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination and generally safe-
guard the interests of the recipient. We do not anticipate that
this assistance would unduly prolong or otherwise encumber the
hearing.
1
Given that a prison disciplinary court's decision frequently turns
on disputed questions of fact, most often reduced to the institutional
witness's word against that of the prisoner, the need for skilled
cross-examination to reveal mistakes of identity, faulty perceptions
or cloudy memory becomes a critical issue. The protection afforded
by cross-examination is meaningless if it is not exercised by someone
with the skill and training to comprehend and maximize its utility.
Further, the stigma of suspicion which often plagues a prisoner when
rebutting incriminating evidence can be displaced by the simple fact
that a lawyer is conducting the questioning. Consider the following
statement taken from an interview with a prisoner at Matsqui
Institution.
I don't know, with Warden's Court there was a lot of truth in what
people say - it's a kangaroo court. A lot of times it comes down to
your word against his [the institutional witness]. A lawyer would
help in these situations. You get choked when you're telling the
truth and you're not believed... a lawyer could help you prepare.
A lot of times you really don't know what the charge is. The judge
might listen to a lawyer more because he's not in the can and I
am... I don't feel I have a fair chance to present my case. I can
tell my story but as soon as the security officer is up, that's it72
Not only cross-examination, but also the manner in which evi-
09 Id. at 6_.
70 397 U.S. 254 (1973).
71 Id. at 270-71.
72 Interview at Matsqui Institution, June 1983.
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dence is presented, can be the full measure of an effective defence.
In one of the first cases observed at Matsqui Institution, two
prisoners faced the serious charge of assaulting another prisoner.
The principal witness was the victim who positively identified both
prisoners. The assault had taken place in the induction area and the
defence was that the two accused prisoners had, at the time of the
alleged assault, been in other parts of the institution. They both
called prisoner witnesses to testify to this effect. The questions put
by the accused prisoners to the witnesses were both leading and
vague. One prisoner/witness was asked "Was I with you on the
evening this happened?" to which the answer given was "yes".
Another was asked, "Isn't it true that when this happened I was
with you all evening except to go to the bathroom for a few min-
utes?" to which the answer again was a simple affirmative. The
manner in which the questions were posed heavily discounted any
weight which may have been given to the answers. Furthermore,
the questions were not well calculated to pinpoint the precise times
at which the assault took place and therefore it was not surprising
that the independent chairperson concluded that the evidence was
indefinite and not inconsistent with the prisoners committing the
assault and spending most of the evening on their ranges. Had the
questions been asked in a proper manner and had there been some
preparation of the witnesses by someone skilled in this matter, the
result may have been different.
It is cases such as this which belie Mr. Justice Cattanach's asser-
tion in Davidson that, because most disciplinary cases involve
simple questions of fact, representation by counsel is unnecessary.
The delineation of material facts is as much a product of advocacy
as the presentation of legal argument. Given the educational level
of many prisoners it is unrealistic to expect them to effectively engage
in such a process. The absence of counsel can frustrate the prisoner's
opportunity to present a full answer and defence, transposing the
doctrine of fairness to a purely mythical plane.
An important category of cases in which counsel has an important
role to play are those in which the charge raises legal issues. Despite
Mr. Justice Cattanach's confident assertion that "in few instances
are there questions of law involved"7 during the course of my
observations these arose with some frequency. The following ex-
amples illustrate the diversity and complexity of legal issues that
can and do arise in prison disciplinary hearings.
73 Supra, note 32.
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In a number of cases prisoners raised as a defence to a charge of
possession of contraband that they did not know the unauthorized
object was in their cell. Contraband is defined as "anything that an
inmate is not permitted to have in his possession".74 Neither the
Regulations nor Commissioner's Directives contain any further defi-
nition of possession. The relevance of a defence of lack of knowledge
depends upon how the offence under the Penitentiary Service
Regulations is classified. In R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie5 the
Supreme Court of Canada set out a tripartite classification of mens
rea, strict liability and absolute liability offences. If the offence is
classified as one of mens rea, it can be argued that the Criminal
Code definition of possession, which is a codification of common
law principles, applies. That definition provides, in section 3(4):
(4) For the purposes of this Act,
(a) a person has anything in possession when he has it in his per-
sonal possession or knowingly
(i) has it in the actual possession or custody of another per-
son, or
(ii) has it in any place, whether or not that place belongs to
or is occupied by him, for the use or benefit of himself
or another person; and
(b) where one of two or more persons, with the knowledge and
consent of the rest, has anything in his custody or possession, it
shall be deemed to be in the custody and possession of each and
all of them.76
The Supreme Court of Canada in Beaver v. The Queen has esta-
blished that in an offence requiring mens rea, possession in law
requires not only physical control but also knowledge of the nature
of the forbidden object, for example in the Beaver case, knowledge
that the substance which was in the accused's control was heroin
as opposed to sugar. If the offence is classified as strict liability
the Crown need only prove that the object was within the accused's
physical control but it is open to the accused to show on a balance
of probabilities that he exercised due diligence, or, put another way,
that he was not negligent in failing to acquire knowledge of the
nature of the forbidden object. If the offence is viewed as imposing
absolute liability, the Crown need only establish that the object was
74 Penitentiary Service Regulations, s. 2.
75 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 3 C.R. (3d) 3o.
70 R.S.C. 1970, c. 34.
77 [1957] S.C.Rq. 531, 18 3.0.0. I2 9 .
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within the accused's physical control and it avails the accused
nothing that he was unaware of the nature of the forbidden object.
Where a prisoner raised a defence of lack of knowledge, it was
dealt with in quite different ways by the various independent chair-
persons. In no case, however, was any reference made to Sault Ste.
Marie nor was there any articulation that a classification of the
offence was required. The issue came up on a number of occasions
where prisoners were double bunked. In one case at Kent two
prisoners who shared a cell were charged with possession of contra-
band home brew. The brew was found in a garbage bag in a metal
pail on the floor of the cell, with a cardboard box over the top of it.
One of thfe prisoners admitted that the brew was his and said his
cellmate knew nothing about it. Addressing the issue of the culpa-
bility of the cellmate, the chairperson took the position that the
institution had to show both physical control and guilty knowledge
and was satisfied that both elements had been established. Physical
control was present because the pail was in a common area of the
cell and not, for example, in a cupboard which contained exclusively
the physical possessions of only one of the prisoners. As to knowl-
edge, the chairperson was satisfied that, given the small area of the
cell and the evidence that the prisoner had been in the cell all
morning prior to the discovery of the brew, it was highly unlikely
that the prisoner could not have known of its presence. The chair-
person in this case was quite specific in stating that "Knowledge is
what I'm really concerned about. I would have to conclude that
they both knew of this material in the cell."
Had counsel been representing the prisoner it could have been
argued that, in a case like this involving allegations of joint posses-
sion, section 3 (4) (b) of the Criminal Code definition as interpreted
in the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision of Terrence"8
requires that there be not only knowledge and control but also
consent. An analogous situation can be found in the Marshall case."0
In R. v. Marshall the accused was a passenger, as a hitchhiker,
when the driver and other passengers produced marijuana which
they proceeded to smoke. The accused himself did not smoke any,
nor exercise any control over it. The court held that there was no
proof that the accused consented to the presence of the marijuana,
though clearly he had knowledge. Consent is clearly a difficult issue
to prove but it means something more than knowledge or even pas-
78 R. v. Terrence (x983) 4 C.C.C. (3d) 409, 33 C.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
79 [1969]3 C.C.C. I49 (Alta. S.C., A.D.).
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sive acquiescence. In Marshall the accused's only choices were to
remain in the car with the marijuana or get out at some deserted
spot on the highway. While the court declined to define the scope
of consent, it was implicit in the judgment that it means knowledge
plus some element of positive participation in the act of possession.
One commentator has suggested that consent in this context is
"knowledge of the identity of the thing possessed by the other person
or persons, together with some act (or omission) that demonstrates
a willingness to acquiesce in the other's possession." 80 Counsel would
argue that the fact that the celmate in this case was in the cell all
morning could not be interpreted as consent. His choices - remain-
ing out of the cell for as long as the brew was in it or informing on
the other prisoner -were no more realistic or reasonable than the
choices confronting Marshall.
In other cases even the relevance of knowledge was significantly
downgraded by the independent chairperson. In the Pelton case,
officers in the course of a regular search of the cell had examined
a black felt pen which they found in a cup containing other pens.
Upon removing the end of the pen they found inside the plastic
barrel a hype kit wrapped in cellophane. At the beginning of the
case the independent chairperson informed the prisoner,
I've had a lot of close cases on contraband.... The rule of it is
that if it's in your cell, you're guilty.... Now I just ruled the other
way this morning because the guy would have to have been a
mechanical genius in a way or would have had to have the tools
to remove the electrical plates to find out whether things were
hidden in there. I think that was going a little too far. An inmate
wasn't expected to do that. But the rule still holds, the general rule,
if it's around your cell, if it's in a reasonably accessible place, which
is most everywhere, you are held guilty. That's just telling you a
general rule. I'm not prejudging the case.
The prisoner, in his defence, stated that he had obtained the pen
in the library where he was using it to underline passages from
reported court cases which were relevant to his appeal and had
taken it back to his cell to finish the work. The pen had been
placed in his cup and was sitting on his desk in full view. There
was no attempt made by him to hide it because, he said, he had
no knowledge that the hype kit was inside it. He stated further that
he had never used a needle to inject drugs in his life. At the con-
clusion of the evidence, the following exchange took place between
the prisoner and the independent chairperson:
80 See A. Mewett and M. Manning, Criminal Law, 2d ed. (0985) at 638.
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CrARPERSON: Well, if you're found guilty it will be on the basis of
the fact that if it's in your possession you have to take
responsibility for it.
PELTON: I had no knowledge of it.
CHAIRPERSON: Well that's a defence in a narrow sense, in a very
narrow sense. Now we had one case this morning that
was defended successfully on that ground. But they
don't occur very often. You can step down and we
can finish this up very quickly. Guilty of contraband.
The sentence is just a warning.
It is quite clear from this case that the chairperson approached this
case as one of strict if not absolute liability. It would appear from
the chairperson's comments that the only kind of case in which the
prisoner would have a defence would be one paralleling the situation
where the prisoner would have to have special tools or extraordinary
skills to discover the presence of contraband secreted in his cell.
The issue of proper classification of an offence within Sault Ste.
Marie is a difficult one at the best of times. It continues to spawn
much litigation. It requires an assessment of the subject matter of
the legislation, whether the offence is criminal in the true sense or
regulatory in nature, the seriousness of the penalty (including col-
lateral consequences) and the precision of the language. It is self-
evident that it is one upon which legal argument is critical to a
proper determination 1
The aftermath of this case is also very significant in pointing up
the role of counsel behind prison walls. Because of the institution's
belief that drug use was increasing at Kent, the Warden, shortly
before this case, had issued a notice advising prisoners:
If an inmate is charged and convicted of an offence relating to
drugs, he can expect to receive the maximum penalty which can be
imposed here if we do not proceed with outside charges. He will
also be placed on screened visits for a period of three months after
which time his case will be reviewed. He will not be permitted to
attend any socials while he is on screened visits. 2
81 The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re
Section 94(2) of the B.C. Motor Vehicle Act (1986) 48 C.R. (3d)
289, 63 N.R. 266, that the imposition of absolute liability where im-
prisonment is a possible punishment violates section 7 of the Charter,
provides a strong basis upon which to argue that no offence under section
39 of the Penitentiary Regulations which has been designated serious or
intermediary can impose absolute liability because the sentences authorized
either lengthen the time a man will remain imprisoned (if remission is
forfeited) or result in his being confined to a prison within a prison (if
punitive dissociation is imposed).
82 Notice dated i April 1985.
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Even though the prisoner in this case received only a warning from
the independent chairperson, he was informed that visits with his
common law wife would be screened for the next three months in
accordance with the notice.
Several legal issues arise from this notice. First, to the extent that
the Warden purports to restrict visiting privileges as a disciplinary
response to conviction of a drug charge, it is arguably in excess of
his jurisdiction. The Penitentiary Service Regulations specifically
refer to loss of privileges as one of the punishments which the inde-
pendent chairperson is authorized to impose. The proper way for
the Warden to make known his views on the seriousness of contra-
band drugs is through his advisers on the disciplinary board who
can make recommendations to the independent chairperson as to
appropriate sentence. These recommendations can stress the need
for deterrence and the chairperson can take those recommendations
into account in imposing sentence.
Secondly, to the extent the Warden's notice is an administrative
as opposed to a disciplinary response, it is arguable that it is an
unlawful fettering of discretion. The Warden has the authority to
restrict visiting privileges in the case of a prisoner convicted of drug
use but his discretion must be exercised after a consideration of all
relevant factors. Of particular relevance would be the existence of
reasonable grounds to believe that the prisoner is involved in the
introduction of the drugs into the prison through visitors. This,
however, requires a case by case examination. What the Warden
has done in his notice is to impose a blanket rule without regard to
the individual circumstances of each case."3 If the prisoner in this
case had been represented by counsel, these arguments could have
been immediately raised with the Warden and, in the event that
the Warden was not prepared to deal with the case on an individual
basis, the matter could have been referred to the Federal Court for
a ruling.
Another charge to which prisoners raised defences which were
deserving of informed submissions by counsel was section 39(g),
which during the time of my observations provided that a prisoner
commits an offence who "is indecent, disrespectful or threatening
in his actions, language or writing towards any other person."84 In
83 For a discussion of a similar issue relating to the fettering of discretion in
the parole context see Gregson v. National Parole Board (1983) 1 G.C.0.
( 3 d) 13, [1983] 1 F.C. 573 (T.D.).
84 As a result of the 1985 amendments the charge now reads "behaves to-
ward any other person, by his actions, language or writing, in an indecent,
disrespectful, threatening or defamatory manner". SOR/I985-631.
r986
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
several cases at Matsqui, prisoners stated in their defence that dis-
respectful words which had been overheard by a guard were not
directed at that guard but were private expressions between prisoners
of their general opinion of penitentiary staff, and therefore were
not prohibited by the section. In one case the prisoner also argued
that his conversation was the exercise of his freedom of expression
and was protected speech under the Charter. In no case were these
arguments accepted as a defence to the charge, nor did the chair-
person give reasoned decisions as to their rejection. However, these
arguments do raise important and complex legal issues. Subsection
(g), by its express wording, requires that the actus reus be directed
"to any other person". In light of the general rule of construction
that a penal statute should be construed strictly in favour of the
liberty of the subject, it is not an unreasonable argument that
generalized derogatory comments made about the staff are not
caught by the section.85 There is also the constitutional argument
based upon the Charter that subsection (g), at least so far as it
seeks to prohibit disrespectful language, is not a reasonable limit
upon freedom of expression demonstrably justifiable in a free and
democratic society.
In Justice Behind the Walls"0 I raised the question of whether,
given the correctional purposes of a penitentiary, it was appropriate
to seek to compel respect through punitive measures. People are not
sent to prison to clean up their language. Given the limited verbal
skils of many prisoners, based in part on low educational levels and
in part on the cultural milieu in which they have grown up, and
given the restrictions placed upon them by life in prison, it is not
altogether quixotic to argue for a prisoner's right to swear. At the
very least it is arguable that it is not demonstrably justifiable that
the need to punish verbal disrespect by prisoners, where it does not
take the form of refusing to obey a lawful order, is integrally related
to the operation of a penitentiary. There is no doubt that life is
more civilized where people accord one another respect and com-
mon courtesy, but on the street we do not view it as necessary to
visit legal sanctions upon those who are disrespectful in their lan-
guage to the police. Why is it necessary to do so in the prison? A
85 Nor, it can be argued, would their comments be caught by the broadening
of the offence in the 1985 amendments to include "defamatory" language.
In tort law, comments directed at a group or class where there is no in-
nuendo that the plaintiff is specifically being referred to are not actionable
as defamation.
s6 Supra, note I.
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counter argument would no doubt focus on the spectre of escalation
from verbal disrespect to disobedience and loss of control by the
authorities if prisoners are not punished for the lesser violations of
disrespect for authority, but with the advent of the Charter the
correctional authorities have the onus of justifying this restriction
on freedom of expression. Suffice it to say that it is an eminently
arguable legal issue upon which the submissions of counsel would
inform a principled decision.
It would seem that another mode in which this offence can be
committed, through the use of threatening language, would more
easily bear the burden of justification as a reasonable limit on free-
dom of expression. But even here there may be legal penumbras of
uncertainty around which issues of protected speech may be argu-
able. In one case a prisoner, Mr. Chester, was charged with being
"threatening in his language or writing towards another person"
as the result of a letter he had written to an officer working in the
visiting and correspondence office. It concerned an incident in the
visiting area involving this officer which had precipitated Chester's
transfer to the super-maximum security Special Handling Unit in
1982. That transfer was actually set aside by the courts,3" but not
until Chester had served almost two years in the SHU. The letter,
in relevant part, stated,
[With regard to] loss of mail and difficulty in clearing my visits,
including [my common law wife] for full regular and family visits,
we shall be going to court.... So being I have to wait until you will
abide me with an opportunity to deal with you as your past actions
deserve. Nothing is forgiven, forgotten or finished. You are still
employed and solvent.
Chester argued at his hearing that the threat was directed to a civil
law suit he was contemplating and that he could not be punished
for giving notice that he intended to exercise his rights to pursue
a remedy in the courts. The independent chairperson dismissed this
argument in the following way:
I think he is threatening to affect the nature of employment and
solvency of an officer.... There is no threat of violence in this that
I see.... We never had one before but I think that it is a threat. I
think the letter is threatening and I find him guilty as charged.
Mr. Chester is not a man well known for his temperate language
and if the document had been written by a lawyer as a letter before
suit it would certainly have been subject to censure. But Mr. Chester
87 Re Chester (1984) 40 C.R. (3d) 146 (Ont. H.C.).
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is not a lawyer and one can hardly expect him to frame his notice
of intention to commence civil process in gentlemanly terms. That
should not deprive him of the protection which would adhere to a
letter before suit which inevitably threatens its addressee with the
potential of having to pay damages. There is very little doubt that
the uncompromising and highly contentious nature of Mr. Chester's
presentation at the hearing significantly reduced the weight of his
arguments. Those same arguments, had they been the subject of a
more amplified and more respectful submission, could have formed
the foundation for a successful defence of the charge.
The charge of disobeying a lawful order is rarely absent from the
docket of the disciplinary court. It often can raise serious legal issues.
An important example of this occurred at Kent Institution where a
prisoner was charged with refusing to bend over to permit a visual
inspection of his buttocks area during a general search of the insti-
tution. The general procedure taken when this type of search is
ordered is that prisoners are asked to leave their cells, are examined
visually, and any clothing is checked to ensure that the prisoner has
no contraband in his possession. The prisoner's cell is also searched.
Prisoner Jobson, who was the inmate committee member for one
of the units, when asked to bend over and expose his buttocks,
refused on the basis that it was his belief that, considering the judg-
ment of Cattanach J. in Gunn v. Yeomans (No. 2),8 unless a staff
member had reasonable and probable grounds to suspect that a
prisoner was in possession of contraband, it was illegal to order a
prisoner to expose his buttocks in the manner ordered on a general
and random basis. The living unit officer phoned the Warden and
then told the prisoner that he had been told to continue the strip
search and that, if necessary, physical means were to be used to
search buttocks areas of prisoners. The prisoner restated his position
that he would strip and permit a visual search of his body but he
would not bend over and spread his buttocks. The prisoner was
then told to get dressed, handcuffed behind his back, and escorted
to the segregation unit. Once there he voluntarily stripped naked
and exposed himself to be visually searched. When ordered to bend
over he again refused to do so, and reiterated his belief that the
order being given to him was not legal. The segregation staff were
then told by the officers in charge to physically take hold of the
prisoner and bend him over to expose his buttocks area. The staff
took hold of the prisoner's legs and arms, spread-eagling his body.
88 (1981) 55 C.C.C. (2d) 452, X14D.L.R. (3d) 288 (F.C.T.D.).
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The officer in charge then grabbed the prisoner's left leg and pried
it from the rest of his body to permit the visual search. The prisoner
was re-handcuffed behind his back and placed back in his cell where
he remained in this condition for about an hour. The prisoner was
then charged with refusing to obey the direct order to bend over
during a skin frisk.
The lawfulness of the officer's order is a complex issue. At the
time of the Gunn decision the only search authority contained in
the Penitentiary Service Regulations was as follows:
Where the institutional head suspects, on reasonable grounds, that
an... inmate... is in possession of contraband he may order that
person to be searched.
Cattanach, J. on an interlocutory injunction application, held that
this regulation required specific suspicion of a given individual "on
reasonable grounds" before he may be searched. Moreover, the
word "inmate" is used in the singular; the word "is" in possession
and not "may be" is used; and the words "that person" are used.
Cattanach J. said that stronger wording was required to justify a
general body search on a routine basis.
Following the decision the regulations were amended. They now
read in relevant part:
[A] ny member may search
(a) any visitor, where there is reason to believe that the visitor has
contraband in his possession... ;
(c) any inmate or inmates, where a member considers such action
reasonable to detect the presence of contraband or to maintain
the good order of an institution .... 89
Assuming without accepting that the amended language is broad
enough to permit routine searches of the kind in question in this
case, there is the further question whether a departure from the
common law requirement of reasonable and probable grounds for a
search can be authorized by delegated legislation. There is a line
of authorities to the effect that delegated legislation cannot be used
to abrogate long-standing common law rights. Thus in Circosta v.
Lilly where the abrogation of the common law rule regarding con-
fidentiality of documents was in issue, Kelly J.A. stated
[I] t is a substantive right to be adversely affected only by the direct
action of the Legislature rather than one which could be taken
away by a procedural rule or regulatory provision enacted by the
19 Section 41(2) SOR/8o-462.
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Rules Committee in the exercise of the authority delegated to
it.... [S]uch a fundamental alteration of well-settled principles of
law lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Legislature.
More recently the principle was affirned by McEachern C.J. in the
Joplin case," where His Lordship stated,
[I]n the absence of clear language, the legislation is not to be pre-
sumed to have authorized the Lieutenant Governor in Council to
make a regulation which abrogates the common law rights of our
citizens to justice and fairness . 2
Beyond this issue is the larger question of whether, under section 8
of the Charter, such a search would be a reasonable one and, if not,
whether searches of this kind are nevertheless demonstrably justi-
fiable within section I of the Charter, given the need to balance
security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of
prisonersS It is patently ludicrous that arguments of this order
should be argued and decided on the basis of lay submissions. Nor
can the demurrer be accepted that the issue will eventually have to
be determined by the courts and, so long as lawyers are available
at that stage, nothing much will be lost by their absence at the
hearing before the disciplinary court. It is a lesson best learned
early on in the professional training of a lawyer that the factual
matrix of a case is often determinative of the success of legal argu-
ments, particularly in a test case situation. If counsel is not at the
disciplinary hearing, he cannot ensure that the factual foundation
is laid for legal arguments he may wish ultimately to have deter-
mined by the courts.
I have reserved for last a discussion of the legal issues which can
arise under section 3 9 (k) of the Regulations, "doing an act calcu-
lated to prejudice the discipline and good order of the institution".
This was the charge which Chief Justice Thurlow, in Howard,
described as "a notoriously vague and difficult charge for anyone to
defend" and MacGuigan J.A. characterized as "a catch-all charge
of such vagueness that the need for counsel to clarify the facts and
to challenge the arguments is strikingly apparent.... ." Consider
90 (1967) 61 D.L.R. (2d) x2 at 15, [1967] 1 O.R. 398 (C.A.).
91 Supra, note 42.
92 Id. at 59.
93 For a discussion of these issues in the U.S. Constitutional context see D.
James, "Constitutional Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons" (1982)
82 Colum. L. Rev. 1033.
94 Supra, note io at 264 and 283.
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the following case. On 5 August 1985, Prisoner Linden was charged
with doing an act calculated to prejudice good order in that he was
under the influence of an unknown substance. The charge sheet
indicated that Linden's speech was slurred, his eyes glazed and his
gait unsteady. Linden, having discussed the matter with the prison
law librarian, made several motions at the conclusion of the insti-
tution's case. These motions asked that the case be dismissed on the
basis that: first, no evidence had been led that the defendant's
conduct was calculated to prejudice the good order and discipline;
and secondly, that the prisoner had been denied natural justice
in that he had not been given an opportunity by the charging officer
to demonstrate his sobriety, in that the officer had never spoken to
him directly nor confronted him with his belief that he was under
the influence. The motions were not supported by any legal argu-
ments and were dismissed by the independent chairperson.
Let us consider the plethora of legal issues embedded in these
motions as well as some issues which were not raised by the prisoner.
On the issue of whether the defendant's conduct was calculated to
prejudice the good order and discipline, the independent chair-
person in rejecting the motion for dismissal referred to the judgment
of Dube J. in Belmont v. Millhaven Institution Disciplinary Court.5
In that case the offence report indicated that "Belmont was sitting
at a picnic table where there was evidence of brew. On the ground
we found three empty cups." He was charged not with possession of
contraband but with an offence under subsection (k). Mr. Justice
Dube in the course of his judgment stated that:
At best, the evidence demonstrates that the applicant was sitting at
a picnic table where some brew may have been drunk by some-
one.... It is very difficult to find a link between the evidence
adduced.., and the offence for which the applicant was charged.
The natural meaning of the words of the charge can be found in
any English dictionary. An act is "an operation, a thing done". To
calculate is to "plan deliberately". In other words, the applicant
was charged with and convicted of having planned and done some-
thing deliberately for the very purpose of prejudicing the good order
and discipline of the institution. There is no evidence of any such act
carried out by the applicant. There is not a scintilla of evidence
from the only witness called by the chairman, that the applicant
did anything calculated to prejudice the discipline or good order of
the penitentiary.
It is not for this court, on a certiorari motion, to weigh the evi-
dence as a Court of Appeal would, so as to assess whether or not
9 (1984) 41 C.R. (3d) 91 (F.O.T.D.).
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there was sufficient evidence to convict the accused. But certiorari
will lie where there is no evidence at all to support a particular
charge.2
The chairperson in Linden's case stated that, in contrast to
Belmont, there was some evidence of the defendant's conduct in this
case in terms of the slurred speech and unsteady gait. As to the
meaning of "calculate" he inclined to the definition of Webster that
it meant "to determine by a process of reasoning" and was to be
applied from the perspective of the charging officer, not the prisoner.
In other words, if the officer determined by a rational process that
the defendant's behaviour was prejudicial to good order and disci-
pline then that was sufficient for the charge. On this latter question
of prejudice to good order, the chairperson commented "We all
know what comes of taking alcohol and drugs."
The position taken by the independent chairperson is in direct
conflict with the view expressed by Dube J. in Belmont which
imports a mens rea element into the offence determined from the
subjective position of the defendant. The prisoner in this case was
not aware of the Belmont case and so obviously was not in a posi-
tion to make any submissions on the proper interpretation of that
case.
It is clear from the statement of the independent chairperson that
he assumed that being under the influence was prejudicial to good
order and discipline. However, at Kent Institution, in most cases
where prisoners are found in an impaired state but otherwise are
not causing problems they are told to go to their cells and lock up
and are not charged. The fact that Linden was charged might be
attributable to the fact that he had been causing some problems on
the range or that this particular charging officer took a stricter view
of discipline than some of his colleagues. Had counsel been at the
hearing an appropriate line of cross-examination of the charging
officer would have been to explore the normal practices at Kent
when dealing with impaired prisoners, for they clearly suggest that
being impaired, so long as the prisoner complies with an order to
lock up, is not prejudicial to good order and discipline. What was
different about Linden's case? Had he attempted to disrupt the living
unit officer's conversations with other prisoners? Had he interfered
with the officer in carrying out his duties or in some other way
overtly threatened good order or discipline? Once again, in the
96 Id. at 95.
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absence of counsel these questions were not asked and the chair-
person was left to treat the case as one of res ipsa loquitur.
There is also more merit than the independent chairperson was
prepared to give credit for in the second submission of the prisoner
- that he was denied natural justice in not being given the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate his sobriety at the time of the alleged offence.
Although the prisoner did not elaborate upon this submission,
counsel no doubt would argue along these lines: that in a case
where the offence is based upon an officer's observations of the
prisoner the most effective way in which a prisoner can defend
himself against the charge is to present, at that time, a reasonable
explanation for his behaviour. For example, he might have been
suffering from dizziness, having a medical history of such a condi-
tion, which explanation could then be verified by medical examina-
tion. Alternatively, the officer could have been mistaken in the
conclusions he was drawing, which the prisoner could demonstrate
by performing certain tasks inconsistent with being drunk or high,
the performance of which tasks could be witnessed by other officers
and prisoners. In the absence of such an opportunity at the time of
the alleged offence, in most cases the prisoner would be left to
raise his defence at the hearing and try to rely upon his own
assertions of innocence or the evidence of other prisoners to verify
his sobriety. In a straight conflict of evidence between a staff mem-
ber and prisoners, an independent chairperson rarely favours the
prisoners. Under these circumstances the prisoner's right to make
full answer and defence is effectively denied by depriving him
of an opportunity to show his defence at the time when he can
most effectively provide evidence which will be probative.
The vagueness inherent in the charge under subsection (k),
particularly where the particularized facts are "being under the
influence of an unknown substance" could also be the subject of a
challenge that the charge is unconstitutionally vague. Such an
argument would be founded upon section 7 of the Charter and
would involve the submission that the principles of fundamental
justice include the requirement that penal statutes be defined with
sufficient precision so that those to whom they are addressed will
have advance notice of what is prohibited and those who are re-
quired to adjudicate on violations of the prohibition have clear
standards upon which to base their adjudication in order to avoid
arbitrariness.1
7
97 See Re Hamilton Independent Variety & Confectionery Stores Inc. and
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It can be anticipated that a constitutional defence of subsection
(k) of the disciplinary code would be that in the special world of
the prison such a subsection is a necessary crime control provision
and therefore, despite its vagueness, constitutes a reasonable limit
on section 7- In 1972, in order to test the argument that the catch-all
provision of section 3 9 (k) was necessary to the smooth running of
the disciplinary process in a prison, I analyzed all charges over a
five-year period to see what kinds of behaviour were the subject of
a subsection (k) charge. I found that the subsection had been of
declining significance in terms of the overall percentage of cases
brought under the section and that, in all but a handful of cases,
the behaviour was more properly the subject of another more
specific charge under the Regulations.
Is the case for subsection (k) any more compelling in 1986?
A review of the disciplinary records from 1981 to 1983 reveals that
the section is even less used than it was ten years earlier: in Matsqui
in 1981, i8.8%; 1982, 17%; in Kent 1983, 4%. Apart from one
case in which the prisoner was charged with having a dummy in
his cell (the charge should more properly have been dealt with as
one of contraband) the particularized facts in all the subsection (k)
charges were being under the influence of an unknown substance
or being in a condition other than normal. In 1985 the Regulations
were amended to create a new offence category in terms of a
prisoner who "consumes, absorbs, swallows, smokes, inhales, injects
or otherwise uses an intoxicant".98 This more specific offence re-
moves the last vestiges of justification for the continued presence of
subsection (k) in the disciplinary lexicon.9
City of Hamilton (1983) 143 D.L.R. (3d) 498 (Ont. C.A.) for the applica-
tion of this principle to by-laws. See also R. v. Red Hot Video Ltd. (1985)
45 C.R. (3d) 36 (B.C.C.A.) and Luscher v. Deputy Minister, Revenue
Canada, Customs and Excise (1985) 45 C.R. (1d) 81, 57 N.R. 386 (Fed.
C.A.).
98 Section 3 9(9i.), supra, note 14.
99 However, the new offence brings a myriad of other legal problems in its
wake. The new Regulations also provide:
4'.1
(x) Where a member considers the requirement of a urine sample neces-
sary to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of an inmate,
he may require that inmate to provide, as soon as possible, such a
sample as is necessary to enable a technician to make a proper
analysis of the inmate's urine, using an approved instrument.
(2) In any hearing in relation to a contravention of paragraph 3 9 (i.),
evidence that a sample of urine taken and analysed in the manner
referred to in subsection (i) contains an intoxicant establishes, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary or in the absence of a
reasonable explanation of the presence of the intoxicant, that the
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There remains to be considered the role of counsel in maling
submissions as to sentence. That role is most clearly justified in those
cases where the prisoner, by reason of emotional distress, is unable to
properly present his own submission, but it is not limited to them.
Defence counsel could be of considerable assistance in fashioning
dispositions that would reduce the likelihood of prisoners reoffend-
ing against the disciplinary code. Based upon my own involvement
in a number of "trouble" cases, defence counsel, with the inde-
pendence he can demonstrate and the reciprocal confidence the
prisoner places in him, can at times come up with a disposition more
inmate who provided the sample has contravened section paragraph
3 9 (i.i) SOR/8 5-42.
It seems clear that the demand for a urine sample under section 41.1(1)
amounts to a search or seizure. However, the section does not require
reasonable and probable grounds that a prisoner has committed an offence
as a precondition to the demand. Arguably this renders the section un-
constitutional as contrary to section 8 of the Charter since the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R.
145, 6 W.W.R. 577. Even if section I of the Charter could be invoked
to justify a lesser standard for a prison search there is a further question
of the constitutionality of the reverse onus clause in section 41.1(2) in
light of the reliability of urinalysis. The courts have dealt with reverse onus
clauses in the context of section r s (d) of the Charter guaranteeing the
presumption of innocence. As I have indicated earlier, there is a judicial
debate, so far unresolved by appellate authority, as to whether a prison
disciplinary offence falls within the protective umbrella of section is(d).
However, a strong argument can be made that the presumption of innocence
is a principle of fundamental justice within section 7 of the Charter that is
applicable to the adjudication of a disciplinary offence where a prisoner's
remission is at stake or he can be sentenced to a prison within a prison.
See the Supreme Court judgment in Reference re Section 94(2) of the
B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, note 8r for an expansive reading of section
7. In considering the validity of reverse onus clauses a crucial question
posed by the courts is whether the presumption of guilt is logically probative
in the sense that there is a rational and not arbitrary connection between
the proven fact and the presumed fact: for example, see R. v. Oakes (1983)
32 C.R. (3d) 193, 40 O.R. (2d) 66o (Ont. C.A.), affd. S.C.C. (28 February
1986) (File No. 17550) [unreported]. In Justice Behind the Walls, supra,
note r at 23, see especially n.49, I reviewed the scientific literature which
cast the gravest doubts on the reliability of urinalysis:
The performance of even the "best" toxicology laboratories on urine
drugs screens is grossly defective with frequent false-positive and false-
negative results and mis-identifications.... There is a serious question
whether urine screens should be done at all under current circumstances.
The conditions under which urinalysis is authorized by the new amend-
ments which say no more than that the test be made by an instrument
approved by Directives and analyzed by a technician, meaning a person
designated by the Commissioner, are hardly sufficient to ensure that the
urinalysis is done under conditions which minimize the high risks of error.
It is therefore arguable that the presumption of guilt flowing from a posi-
tive urinalysis is not logically probative but rather arbitrary. Also, given
the general principle that an offence must be specific enough to allow the
accused to identify the transaction, the question arises whether urinalysis
can be probative of an offence on a specified date. Expert evidence suggests
that a positive finding leaves open a great deal of ambiguity as to when a
particular drug may have entered the body.
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responsive to the problems which the prisoner poses. As an example,
in a case in a women's prison where the authorities had all but
resolved to transfer a prisoner to maximum security because of her
violent and recalcitrant behaviour which seemed immune to disci-
plinary action, I suggested that the prisoner give a series of under-
takings as to the specific behaviours from which she would refrain,
coupled with her compiling a journal of her relationships with staff
which she was to share with the deputy warden. The purpose of this
was to identify problems before they occurred and to seek appro-
priate preventive action. This disposition worked where no other
had. Again, as I suggested in the Peters case, dispositions which
rely upon the strength of native spiritual programs may be more
positive vehicles for creating a climate of respect for staff and
institutional rules than can a term in solitary confinement.
There are several other sentence-related matters where counsel
for the prisoners would play an important role. The first relates to
consistency. In Justice Behind the Walls I concluded that consis-
tency of sentencing principles was conspicuous by its absence in
the proceedings before warden's court. 00 One of the benefits I
advanced to reinforce the recommendation to have independent
chairpersons preside over disciplinary hearings was that legally
trained chairpersons would bring with them an understanding of the
importance of treating like cases alike and be in a better position to
develop a consistent set of sentencing practices. Unhappily this has
not come about. Based upon cases I have observed at Kent and
Matsqui from 1983 to 1985, my conclusion is that sentencing by
the independent chairpersons is as capricious as the warden's court,
and bears no greater resemblance to a fair, consistent and coherent
system of justice than it did. This is a serious issue because disparity
of sentencing assumes particular importance in the prison. It is not
that disparity does not exist outside of the prison; it does and it is a
serious problem. However, its impact is diffused over a much larger
number of cases. Apparent disparity often is explained by the wide
range of mitigating or aggravating factors which courts take into
account in dealing with the whole spectrum of criminal charges.
Disparity in sentencing inside a prison is there for everyone to see
and rather than being diffused it is concentrated. Furthermore, the
disparity is usually more real because of the much narrower range
of offences and the more circumscribed nature of the factors which
can aggravate or mitigate the offence. In the prison there is a
:o Supra, note i at 54.
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greater need to give priority to the principle of equality of sentencing
and it is a goal which is more easily contained and demonstrated
than in the larger criminal justice system.
The principal reason for the disparity I observed is that advisers,
who play a significant role in shaping the sentence of the inde-
pendent chairperson, do not give high priority to the principle of
treating like cases alike. Although the disciplinary records are avail-
able and they provide a bird's eye view of broad trends in sentencing
for particular offences, neither the staff nor the independent chair-
person saw fit to use these records to provide informational feed-
back. Rather, they developed what might be termed the custom of
individual cases; each adviser bringing to bear his sense of what
the right sentence should be. The fact that the advisers change
weekly compounds this problem. An important function of counsel
for the prisoner would be to urge a more principled basis to sentenc-
ing in disciplinary court and to help provide an informational frame-
work to ensure its implementation."'
Another sentence-related matter concerns the relationship between
the disciplinary board's sentence and the decision of the Earned
Remission Board. The independent chairpersons at Kent and Mats-
qui had little if any understanding of the earned remission conse-
quences of a conviction in disciplinary court with the result that, in
many cases, prisoners received greater punishment than the chair-
person intended. For example, in one case a prisoner convicted of
assault, who was nearing the end of a very lengthy sentence, was
told by the chairperson that in lieu of a sentence of twenty-five days
dissociation and twenty-five days loss of remission he would be
sentenced to forty days dissociation so as not to delay the date of
his release. At the Earned Remission Board the month following
he failed to earn fifteen days based on the seriousness of the offence
and the twenty-two days spent in dissociation. The next month he
failed to earn six days for the remaining eighteen days spent in
dissociation. In total, therefore, he failed to earn twenty-one days
loss of remission as well as serving forty days in solitary confinement.
Counsel for the prisoner would ensure that the chairperson was
101 One of the most glaring examples of disparity relates to giving a prisoner
credit for time spent in administrative dissociation awaiting the disciplinary
hearing. When a prisoner raised this issue, no, some or full credit was
given on a completely random basis. The 1985 amended Commissioner's
Directives on discipline now contain some guidelines for appropriate
sentences for minor, intermediary and serious offences. However, based on
my observations since the coming into force of these Directives, there has
been no significant change in sentencing practices.
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aware of the full implications of conviction to avoid such com-
pounding of punishment.
I have concentrated so far on specific examples of the type of cases
in which representation by counsel is demonstrably related to the
conduct of a fair hearing. There is another dimension to legal
representation. I have illustrated how at Matsqui and Kent judicial
rulings were not adhered to in the daily practice of administrative
decision making within the walls. A powerful incentive for ad-
herence to the rule of law will, in my judgment, flow from the
knowledge that lawyers will, on a regular basis, be standing vigilant
to ensure that the rules are followed.
In the Davidson case, Cattanach J. suggested that the legal
expertise of the independent chairperson was sufficient to ensure a
proper consideration of the facts and legal principles favouring the
accused's case, rendering it unnecessary to have counsel in all but
exceptional circumstances. The judgment envisages that the inde-
pendent chairperson can function as both judge and advocate in the
same proceedings. In a number of the cases I observed, the inde-
pendent chairpersons sought to play this dual role. The chairpersons
would, on occasions when a prisoner was having difficulty framing
questions, conduct a limited form of cross-examination for the
prisoner. In several cases the chairpersons advised the prisoner at
the plea-taking stage of the proceeding that, in the light of what
the prisoner had said on the issue of plea, he should enter a plea of
not guilty under circumstances where, in the absence of this advice,
the prisoner would have pleaded guilty against his best interests.
Notwithstanding these interventions, it is my judgment that, overall,
the independent chairpersons viewed their responsibilities principally
as adjudicators and there was a limit to how much help they were
able to offer the prisoner. The limitation resulted not only from their
own perception of their role but also from the institutional context
in which they operated. The chairpersons have no knowledge of the
facts of each case before the hearing begins and have not interviewed
witnesses. Thus they have a limited ability to assess which questions
should be asked and what information should be exposed relevant
to the defence of the prisoner.
The independent chairperson's lack of knowledge of any facts
except those that come up at the hearing is particularly prejudicial
to the prisoner who, because of depression or hopelessness, refuses or
is unable to defend himself. As several of the cases I have docu-
mented illustrate, it is vital to a fair hearing in these cases that
counsel be able to interview other prisoners and staff to enable him
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to assess whether there is any defence and to determine which sub-
missions are appropriate on the question of disposition of the case.
Furthermore, since the independent chairperson is seen by most
prisoners as an agent of the institution and not there to represent
their interests, the chairperson is quite unable to assist the prisoner
who is already having great difficulty in controlling his feelings
towards the authorities. In these cases the chairperson, because of
the overt hostility of the prisoner, is ineluctably forced to take a
position adverse to the prisoner.
It will be recalled that in Howard the Department of Justice did
not argue there were reasonable limits, prescribed by law, that
pursuant to section i of the Charter could circumscribe the right to
counsel. Are there legitimate institutional interests that a prisoner's
right to counsel at prison disciplinary hearings might jeopardize
which could qualify as reasonable limits to the right? There are two
such interests which have been articulated by the courts and which
also have featured in my own interviews with staff. They are, first,
that a right to counsel will lead to inordinate delay in the hearing
of cases with the result that the disciplinary process will be rendered
ineffectual, and second, that the presence of counsel will increase the
adversarial aspect of the process with the result that the lines be-
tween prisoners and staff will be further reinforced in a way which
would have a negative impact on rehabilitative and other correc-
tional goals.
A number of judicial pronouncements involving the disciplinary
process are quite explicitly based on a model of prison justice in
which the disciplinary response is swift and necessarily so in order to
maintain correctional order. The Commissioner's Directives support
this model of speedy disposition of cases by providing that "the
hearing of a charge shall commence, as far as practical, within
seven working days from the date the charge was laid unless a
justifiable reason warrants delay."M 2
The facts, however, reveal a rather different profile of the
efficiency of prison justice. At both Kent and Matsqui during the
period of my observations (at a time when counsel were not per-
mitted at hearings) it was the exception rather than the rule that a
case was heard within the seven working day period. Adjournments
were readily granted, principally at the request of the institution, on
the basis that witnesses were not available due to their being on
afternoon or evening shift, on rest day, on vacation, or otherwise
102 C.D. 600.7 3.1 para. 22.
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unavailable. Indeed it was not uncommon for there to be several
adjournments on this basis. Prisoner requests for adjournments were
also regularly granted. Such requests were usually based on an
expressed need for more time to prepare a defence. In many cases
there would be a combination of adjournments, some emanating
from the institution and some from the prisoners. On several occa-
sions the independent chairpersons expressed some concern about
delays in bringing a case forward, and indeed it was the practice of
the chairperson at Matsqui to dismiss a case when he had already
granted two adjournments at the request of the institution and they
were still not ready to proceed at the third appearance. In order to
get a better overall picture of the time frame within which cases
were adjudicated, I reviewed the disciplinary records at both Kent
and Matsqui for 1983. The following table shows the results of
that analysis.
Number of Days
Until Final % of Total Cases
Disposition Kent Matsqui
1 to 7 days 29.5 28
8 to 14 days 29 38
15 to 21 days 19 19
more than 21 days 22.5 15103
It is within this profile of the disciplinary process that the issue
of representation by counsel must be placed. It is not an unduly
onerous task to construct a system of legal representation to function
within a system in which, in two out of three cases, there is an
adjournment beyond the seven day period. It is my impression that
the highest percentage of guilty pleas occurs in those cases which
are disposed of within the first week after a charge has been laid.
It is likely that, within this class of case, there will be the least
demand for legal representation. For the rest of the caseload it is
now part of the procedure to grant prisoners adjournments to per-
mit them to consult with counsel.
Extending the purpose of the adjournment to permit the actual
attendance of counsel need not pose any additional delay. The only
103 A quite different profile is presented from an analysis of the disposition of
minor offences, which are handled by living unit officers in a more informal
manner. Of these, 44% were dealt with within 7 days, 40% within 14,
12% within 21, and only 4% in excess of 21 days. Speedier adjudication
of minor offences is principally due to the fact that there is a much higher
percentage of guilty pleas (obviating the need for any witnesses); where
witnesses are required the hearing is scheduled to accord with times in
which they are available.
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problems which would arise would be if the prisoner selected counsel
who had a heavy trial calendar which precluded counsel from
attending before the disciplinary board until sometime in the distant
future. Here, in the interests of speedy adjudication, it would be
justifiable to impose some constraints on the question of the choice
of legal representative. One possible solution to accommodate the
institutional need for cases to be dealt with within a reasonably
approximate relationship to their occurrence would be to make
legal representation available through a panel of lawyers acting as
duty counsel. Already, in the wake of the Howard decision, several
such systems have been put in place in Ontario and Manitoba and
are working without causing significant problems to the scheduling
of cases.
If the intervention of lawyers will not prejudice the early schedul-
ing of cases, will it have a negative impact by increasing the ad-
versarial nature of the proceedings? Here also it is necessary to
separate the way in which disciplinary court proceedings are some-
times ideally characterized by the courts from the real system in
operation. The facts of the matter are that disciplinary hearings
before the independent chairpersons are already adversarial in
nature. This reality is a function of both the dynamics of the power
relationship between prisoners and guards and the structure and
format of the proceedings. The Commissioner's Directives themselves
provide for a trial-like process in which the institution's case is pre-
sented with an opportunity for the prisoner to cross-examine wit-
nesses and give evidence in his own defence. It was the common
practice for one of the independent chairpersons at Kent to refer
to the institution as "the Crown" and institutional witnesses as
"Crown witnesses". For their part the prisoners are in no doubt
that what is being invoked against them in the disciplinary court is
the same authority that sent them to the "pen", its relationship to
them more intense and pervasive but no less adversarial.
From my interviews with correctional staff the fear of increased
adversariness is the spectre of criminal lawyers coming into the
prison and demeaning them in front of the prisoners through aggres-
sive and intimidating cross-examination. That spectre is one heavily
based upon television dramatizations of the role of counsel. This is
a far cry from the normal way in which criminal counsel operate.
The nature of the charges which form the typical docket of disci-
plinary court is not the stuff of which dramatic cross-examination is
made. Indeed, far from increasing the adversarial nature of pro-
ceedings, it is my view that in many cases the participation of
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counsel would have quite the opposite effect. I have already pointed
out that, in some of the cases I observed where prisoners were
extremely hostile to the witnessing officers, the very fact of their
hostility impaired their ability to conduct their defence. Not only
would representation by counsel result in a fairer hearing in such
cases but the very fact of counsel conducting the cross-examination
would avoid what often happens under the present arrangement
where the hearing process aggravates and intensifies an already
hostile relationship. Not only would counsel's participation reduce
the level of personal hostility, it is also likely in such cases to result
in a more efficient and orderly hearing. As several of the transcripts
indicate, unruly or hostile prisoners pose considerable problems for
the conduct of a disciplinary hearing which becomes interspersed
with long harangues by the prisoner and futile attempts to cross-
examine, and often further charges with the need for yet more
hearings.
In Justice Behind the Walls"" I reported an experiment I con-
ducted at the U.B.C. law school to test the hypothesis that the
involvement of counsel, far from rendering hearings less manage-
able and more time-consuming, would result in a more expeditious
conduct of the trials. The experiment affined this hypothesis.
Further confirmation as to the effects of counsel's participation can
be gleaned from the accumulated experience before the National
Parole Board where, since 1978, counsel have been permitted to
act as assistants. I have represented prisoners in this capacity on
many occasions, particularly in cases where there are complicated
issues of fact and law. It has been my experience and that of mem-
bers of the National Parole Board that participation of counsel does
contribute to the orderly presentation of the prisoner's case and
helps frame the relevant issues for the Board's decision. Again, from
my own experience of dealing with several prisoners who have had
stormy experiences within the institutions, counsel's participation
also has the effect of instilling in the prisoner some confidence that
his voice and his case will be heard and dealt with on the merits.
A strong case can be made that, far from disrupting the correc-
tional mission, the introduction of the right to counsel may have a
positive role in furthering the correctional goals of maintaining
institutional order and prisoner rehabilitation. Counsel's interven-
tion would increase the likelihood that punishment would be im-
posed only when that punishment is due. Unacceptable behaviour
104 Supra, note x.
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would still be met with an appropriate disciplinary response, yet
the prisoner would gain a sense that the proceedings were conducted
fairly. In Palmigiano v. Baxter'05 the United States Federal Court
of Appeal stated:
The orderly care with which decisions are made by the prison
authority is intimately related to the level of respect with which
prisoners regard that authority. There is nothing more corrosive to
the fabric of a public institution such as a prison than a feeling
among those whom it contains that they are being treated unfairly1 6
A prisoner's perception of the fairness of the disciplinary proceed-
ings will favourably influence his willingness to accept that decision.
Under the present arrangements the disciplinary hearing is still
viewed by many prisoners as a kangaroo court. Discipline imposed
under what they perceive to be an oppressive and unfair regime
only serves to increase their hostility as well as the frequency with
which they are likely to be charged and brought back before the
court. It is a downward spiral which further undermines good order
in the institution as it increases the likelihood of the prisoner emerg-
ing from imprisonment further embittered against the society in
whose name he has been punished.
In the Howard case Mr. Justice MacGuigan pointed out that the
recognition of the right to counsel, bespeaking the fullness of the
adversary process, would lead inevitably to the introduction of a
prosecuting officer, the complete disappearance of any inquisitorial
aspect of the process, and the full acceptance of an adversarial
system. He concluded:
I accept this as an accurate estimate of the likely consequences, but
not as an argument in terrorem. If it is what fundamental justice
requires, it is a step forward rather than a limitation10 7
This conclusion is supported by my own observations. Just as I
have documented the cases where the absence of counsel prejudiced
a fair hearing for the prisoner, so it is possible to identify parallel
cases in which the absence of counsel representing the institutional
interests was prejudicial to a proper presentation of the case against
the accused. Typically this occurred when proof of the offence
required the evidence of a series of institutional witnesses. Under the
present procedures no staff member is charged at the hearing with
"'s 487 F. 2d i28o (1973).
200 Id. at 1283.
107 Supra, note so at 28o.
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the task of calling witnesses or examining them in chief. In a num-
ber of cases the witnesses were summoned from their security posts
or living unit duties and the order of presentation of witnesses
corresponded to the order in which they arrived at the courtroom.
Predictably this resulted in a lack of continuity in the chronology of
events which militated against the chairperson having a full under-
standing of the incident. Another deficiency resulting from the
absence of a person charged with the presentation of the case for
the institution was that not infrequently one officer would give
evidence, omitting important details because he assumed, incorrectly,
that another officer had already covered that material in prior
testimony. The result here was that critical elements in the institu-
tion's case failed to be proved. The resulting acquittal of the prisoner
under these circumstances inevitably led to considerable bitterness
on the part of the staff because, in their minds, their collective evi-
dence should have resulted in a conviction.
The most graphic example of this phenomenon is seen in a case
involving a prisoner charged with doing an act with intent to escape.
The charge arose from the presence in the prisoner's cell of a plexi-
glass shelf with one corner cut out and the concomitant discovery,
secreted in an adjacent area of the prison, of a bag containing a
small piece of plexiglass in the process of being fashioned into a key,
and two pairs of wire cutters. In that case the living unit supervisor
who had co-ordinated the search operation was not available at the
beginning of the hearing and only gave testimony at the very end,
by which point the chairperson had already expressed his serious
doubts about the institution's case. The chairperson acquitted the
prisoner, having concluded that the two pieces of plexiglass were
not related because the small piece was half the thickness of the
larger piece.
After the hearing the living unit supervisor approached me with
the two pieces of plexiglass and pointed out that the bevels on the
two pieces matched perfectly and the explanation for the smaller
piece half the width of the larger was that it had been cut in half
with a hack-saw blade. I pointed out to him that he had not ex-
plained to the chairperson the basis upon which he had formed the
opinion that the two pieces were related and had therefore left the
chairperson to draw his own conclusion.
Had there been counsel for the institution this officer's evidence
would have been presented, not as a postscript, as it was, but as the
foundation for the institution's case. Proper examination in chief
by counsel would have laid the basis for the officer's judgment as
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to the relationship between the two pieces of plexiglass. Counsel for
the institution, in presenting the institution's case, would also have
led evidence relevant to the exculpatory statement made by the
prisoner that he had taken the large piece of plexiglass from the
prisoners' washroom where it served as a shelf and that it already
had the corner piece cut out. Evidence by officers of searches they
made of that washroom during the period when the offence was
alleged to have taken place could establish whether they observed
the shelf in place, undamaged or damaged. This is not to say that
the prisoner would necessarily have been convicted, but that it
would have ensured that all of the institution's evidence was properly
presented. As it was, the acquittal was seen by the staff as a travesty
of justice rather than as an inevitable consequence of the inadequacy
of the presentation of the evidence."0 8
Counsel for the institution could serve other important functions
related to the efficiency of the proceedings. Counsel charged with
the conduct of the institution's case would be able to do a better
job of scheduling cases so as to avoid as much as possible adjourn-
ments due to the absence of witnesses or to the prisoner's need to
consult with defense counsel. The institution's case would also be
presented in a more efficient way, avoiding unnecessary duplication
of staff witnesses but ensuring that the evidence was appropriately
co-ordinated to establish each essential element of the case. The
staff's concern that defence counsel might intimidate them would
be offset by the knowledge that they had a representative at the
hearing. Counsel would also be the principal voice through which
submissions as to appropriate sentence were made. This would
relieve the staff from sitting on the board as advisers, freeing them
for other responsibilities. It would also be more effective in assuring
some continuity and consistency in sentencing options. Institutional
counsel would also, of course, have the important role of making
or responding to legal submissions made by counsel for the prisoners.
The involvement of both institutional and defence counsel in
cases where important issues of law are involved could lead to
108 This case also illustrates the need for legal representation of the prisoner.
The charge of doing an act with intent to escape is one of the most serious
in the disciplinary calendar. In the particular circumstances of this prisoner,
conviction would have triggered a transfer to the Special Handling Unit,
the most restrictive form of imprisonment in the Canadian carceral
archipelago. Difficult legal issues arise relating to the actus reus of the
charge, particularly whether the Criminal Code definition of attempt as
"an act beyond preparation" applies, and what tests should be used to
determine if an act is beyond preparation. See my discussion of this issue
in supra, note i at 45.
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matters being referred to the courts under a specially legislated
procedure to give the independent chairpersons the power to state
a case on points of law. This would be particularly appropriate
where similar legal issues had arisen before several independent
chairpersons and had resulted in conflicting rulings.
V. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HOWARD: JUSTICE
DELIVERED OR JUSTICE DENIED?
I have already made the point that in the world of the peni-
tentiary, rules, whether laid down by the Correctional Service itself
through directives or prescribed by the court, do not necessarily
translate into administrative practice. A final matter I will review
is the way in which the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Howard
has been received by the Correctional Service and some of the
problems of implementation at Kent Institution. Such review per-
mits us to understand some of the limitations of litigation as a
strategy of reform and the limited vision which the Correctional
Service itself has of the rule of law.
The Federal Court of Appeal decision in Howard was handed
down on i March i985. Four months later amendments to the
Penitentiary Service Regulations were passed introducing, in place
of the dual classification of serious and minor offences, a tripartite
one of serious, intermediary and minor. As I have expressed, both
serious and intermediate offences come before the independent chair-
person. The difference between the two categories hinges upon the
fact that the prisoner can be sentenced to loss of remission only
following conviction of a serious offence. On my first visit to Kent
Institution following the promulgation of the amendments I asked
several of the assistant wardens what they understood to be the
reason for the introduction of the new intermediary offence. Their
response was that it was designed to get around the Howard dec-
ision, since the right to counsel for the prisoner was only applicable
for serious offences. My initial impression of this response was that
it was an overly cynical one. My view, however, quickly changed
when I was shown by one of the independent chairpersons a
memorandum he had received from the Correctional Services' legal
counsel explaining the new amendments. It stated in relevant part:
The amendments are very important with respect to the classifica-
tion of offences. There will be three categories of offences, only the
cases falling into the flagrant or serious offence category will qualify
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for representation by counsel, inasmuch as the accused inmates have
remission to their credit.10 9
To interpret the Howard case is limiting the right to counsel to one
in which prisoners' remission is in jeopardy is to read the case in its
narrowest form. Howard in fact was sentenced to a loss of remission
and the Court therefore naturally focused its analysis on the liberty
interest such forfeiture involved. But the Court, in speaking of the
circumstances in which the prisoner would have a right to repre-
sentation, stated that this would depend "on the circumstances of
the particular case, its nature, its gravity, its complexity and the
capacity of the inmate himself to understand the case and present
his defence. The list is not exhaustive."110 Even if Howard can be
read as affording a right to counsel only where remission is at stake,
to see the intermediary offence category as a means to avoid the
implications of the decision is flawed. While a prisoner cannot be
sentenced at the disciplinary board hearing to loss of remission for
an intermediary offence, he will nevertheless have his liberty interest
affected by failing to earn remission arising directly from the com-
mission of the offence as a result of the earned remission scheme. As
I have explained, for every three days in punitive dissociation a
prisoner will fail to earn one day of remission and, depending upon
the gravity of the offence, the Earned Remission Board can fail to
credit up to the maximum of fifteen days remission for that month.
In my review of the earned remission awards for Kent Institu-
tion in the month following the new amendments introducing the
intermediary offence category, the prisoners who were convicted of
intermediary offences were dealt with very severely by the Earned
Remission Board. In one case the prisoner was charged under sub-
section (k) with doing an act calculated to prejudice the discipline
and good order in that he was found in another prisoner's cell at
5 o'clock in the morning. At the hearing before the disciplinary
board, the prisoner received a suspended sentence of fifteen days
dissociation. As a result of the decision of the Earned Remission
Board he failed to earn ten days remission. In two other cases,
prisoners charged with threatening officers who received disciplinary
sentences of ten days loss of recreation privileges in the one case and
ten days punitive dissociation in the other, both failed to earn the
109 Memorandum from Suzanne Poirier, 24 June 1985.
'10 Supra, note io at 262.
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maximum fifteen days remission."' For these prisoners and indeed
for all prisoners who inevitably fail to earn remission following con-
viction of an intermediary offence, to be told that they do not have
the right to counsel because, at the disciplinary hearing, the inde-
pendent chairperson could not sentence them to loss of remission, is
calculated to do nothing but further prisoners' disdain for the
Correctional Service's claim that justice now runs behind prison
wallsY'
The clear message of the memorandum from the Correctional
Services' lawyer, that the right to counsel could be avoided through
the vehicle of the intermediary offence, did not fall on deaf ears.
By the end of August nearly every offence which came before the
independent chairperson at Kent Institution was designated an
intermediary one with the result that prisoners were told that they
had no right to counsel.1 3 This was the answer they had been given
prior to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Howard, based on
the independent chairperson's misunderstanding of the law as set
down in the Davidson line of cases. The same response in Septem-
ber 1985 is much more clearly based upon the correctional authori-
ties' intent to limit the application of the law as set out in the
Howard case.
Even before introduction of the intermediary offence, the right
to counsel proclaimed in Howard had not in fact resulted in repre-
sentation for federal prisoners in British Columbia. This flowed
principally from the refusal by the British Columbia Legal Services
Society to extend legal aid to prisoners for disciplinary hearings.
Under the Legal Services Society Act, a person would qualify for
:11 A review of the Earned Remission Board minutes for July-December 1985
at Kent Institution reveals that the average failure to earn remission award
flowing from conviction of an intermediary offence was ten days.
112 The Correctional Service's interpretation of Howard as not applying to
offences where the disciplinary board can only impose dissociation as
opposed to loss of remission because only remission affects a prisoner's
liberty interest under section 7 of the Charter is further undermined by the
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Cardinal and Oswald
v. The Queen, supra, note 8. The Court there held that confinement in
dissociation constituted a deprivation of the relative or residual liberty of a
prisoner, the legality of which could be challenged through habeas corpus.
The Service's interpretation of Howard discriminates against prisoners
who are serving life or indeterminate sentences. Such prisoners are not
eligible to earn remission. For them, the most important elements of residual
liberty are their security matrix and parole prospects. Conviction of an
intermediary offence may have a significant impact on both.
113 A review of the disciplinary board minutes for September-December 1985
confirms this initial trend. All offences coming before the Board were
classified as intermediary with the exception of assaults on staff or assaults
on other prisoners where bodily harm was caused.
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legal aid if he were (a) the defendant in criminal proceedings that
could lead to his imprisonment, or (b) might be imprisoned or con-
fined through civil proceedings, or (c) has a legal problem that
threatens his livelihood.
Following the denial of eligibility by the Legal Services Society
to a prisoner charged with the serious offence of doing an act with
intent to escape, the matter came before Mr. Justice Meredith of the
B.C. Supreme Court. His Lordship, while conceding that the prisoner
faced with a loss of remission or punitive dissociation could be said
to be involved in proceedings that could lead to his imprisonment
(in the one case by extending the length of time he would remain
confined and in the other case by being confined in a prison within
a prison), ruled that the proceedings were neither criminal nor civil
but disciplinary. In the course of his judgment Mr. Justice Meredith
pointed out that, while Howard might give the prisoner the right
to counsel, "nothing is said of any reciprocal obligation to provide
and pay for counsel"."1 4 The result of this decision is that unless
the prisoner can afford to retain private counsel his admitted right
to representation is an empty one.
A number of consequences have been flowing from the fact that
prisoners have an acknowledged right to counsel but there is no
reciprocal obligation on the part of the Legal Services Society to
provide it. Prisoners ineligible for legal aid have been forced to cast
around in an attempt to find lawyers who will represent them based
upon some moral obligation flowing from having been their counsel
during a criminal trial, or on the basis of a future promise to pay
when they are released. This has resulted in prisoners coming to the
disciplinary hearing and requesting adjournments in order to consult
with counsel almost as a matter of course and having to make
further application when their initial approaches do not yield posi-
tive results. These requests for adjournment, coupled with the insti-
tution's requests based on co-ordinating the hearing with witnesses'
work schedules have resulted in inordinately long delays before
final adjudication.
The result is a shared sense of frustration among everyone in-
volved in the process. The prisoner is frustrated by the right he is
said to have but cannot realize; the staff is frustrated by what they
see as the games prisoners play in seeking adjournments; the warden
and his senior administrators in not having disciplinary problems
resolved quickly; and the independent chairpersons who know that
114 Reasons for Judgment, Landry v. Legal Services Society July 6, 1985.
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their decisions rendered in the absence of counsel may be vulnerable
to judicial nullification.
It is very important to understand that these consequences flow
not from the Howard ruling that there is a right to counsel but from
the failure to implement the right. For the Howard case to be
effective in improving the quality of prison justice, it must be ac-
companied by the availability of counsel to all prisoners whose right
it is to have counsel represent them. This reflects one of the limita-
tions of a reform strategy which relies exclusively upon court inter-
vention. The impetus for reform comes from outside the system, and
is itself the outcome of an adversarial process. As such it is resisted
by the correctional authorities as an intrusion. The laying of the
informational base to ensure that the rationale for reform is under-
stood by correctional staff and the creation of a resource base to
ensure that the reform is implemented are not part of the relief
courts are asked to grant. It is more likely that a legislated right to
counsel, where the necessary foundation work has been done in
advance to ensure that the resources are available to translate the
law into the life of the prison, will achieve real reform in the
practice of prison justice. Such a legislated right would have to
face the fact that, since representation by counsel is an essential part
of the disciplinary process its cost is an integral part of running a
prison system. Justice behind federal penitentiary walls must not be
dependent upon the vagaries of provincial legal aid legislation just
as it cannot depend upon the restrictive interpretation by correc-
tional authorities of judicial decisions.
I do not wish to be interpreted as gainsaying the utility of a litiga-
tion strategy. For the most part it is all lawyers have to offer
prisoners. But as this analysis shows, rights wrested from the courts
can be negated in practice all too easily. My experience and research
have led me ineluctably to the conclusion that only if the recogni-
tion of those rights is mandated as part of the legislative structure
of Canadian penitentiaries and enforced on a daily basis through
the vigilance of the legal profession, will there be any real change
in the nature of prison justice."5
This gives rise to a strategic dilemma for reformers. In times of
economic restraint and public antipathy for the rights of prisoners,
legislators have little incentive to place the codification of prison
administrative law high on their reform slates. Most lawyers, there-
115 For a similar conclusion in relation to the reform of administrative dissocia-
tion see Prisoners of Isolation, supra, note 9.
VOL. 20:2
1986 RIGHT TO COUNSEL 283
fore, continue to litigate, because at least the ear of the court can
be gained, even though things may not change very much inside the
walls. While this is not exactly a counsel of despair, it is not an
energizing prospect. What it suggests is the need for a dual initiative.
A legislative strategy must buttress a litigation one. The legal profes-
sion, as it identifies issues of fundamental justice which require
articulation and redress in the judicial forum, must also play a
leadership role in the development of comprehensive prison adminis-
trative codes and must press hard for their passage into legislation.
Two developments give cause for some optimism in this regard.
The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Solicitor General
have, as part of the overall criminal law reform project, identified
correctional law as a special area of review. More recently the
Canadian Bar Association has established a special committee to
review and make recommendations on correctional law. It is to be
hoped that through these initiatives, paralleling the continued
vigilance of the courts, the rule of law will become entrenched, not
only in the Canadian Constitution, but also in the Canadian prison.

